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There are three potential Russian nuclear contingencies in the Caucasus that merit 
analysis: a conflict internal to the Russian Federation; a conflict involving Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and/or Georgia; and a conflict involving Turkey. The Caucasus is the region 
in which it is most plausible that Russia might resort to nuclear weapons in extreme 
circumstances. This region has been in turmoil since the collapse of the Soviet Union; 
and the prospects for continued conflict are great, given ethnic tensions and competing 
strategic ambitions regarding the region's energy resources. Russia faces a gap between 
its geopolitical ambitions and its conventional military capabilities. Its conventional 
military forces are in disarray and efforts at reform have been unsuccessful. Many in the 
Russian military establishment, having been trained under the Soviet nuclear doctrine that 
upheld the efficacy of limited nuclear weapons employment, now see the limited use of 
nuclear weapons as a genuine option in regional wars. NATO must deal squarely with 
this potential problem by formulating options for conflict prevention and, if necessary, 
for response. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze three possible Russian nuclear 
contingencies in the Caucasus: a conflict internal to the Russian Federation; a conflict 
involving Armenia, Azerbaijan and/or Georgia; and a conflict involving Turkey 
The thesis considers the evolution of Soviet nuclear doctrine to set the stage for an 
analysis of the current Russian nuclear doctrine. Soviet nuclear doctrine evolved in 
historical and ideological circumstances distinct from those of the United States. In its 
ultimate form, Soviet nuclear doctrine was in fact a warfighting strategy. Deterrence was 
seen as desirable, but the Soviets refused to be governed by the concept of Mutual 
Assured Destruction. According to Soviet doctrine, a realistic plan for conducting 
nuclear war would provide the most effective basis for deterrence. 
Russia today faces a widening gap between its ambitions and its capabilities. Its 
conventional military forces are in disarray, with little prospect of imminent 
improvement. Attempts at military reform have met with little success due to political 
disagreements and Russia's continuing economic crisis. At the same time, many 
Russians still consider their country to be a great power. The only way to preserve this 
status in military terms is to rely on the nuclear arsenal that Russia inherited from the 
Soviet Union. The published discussions among Russian military officers and 
commentators about the drastically lowered nuclear threshold offer cause for alarm. 
These officers were trained under Soviet doctrine that called for the purposeful use of 
nuclear weapons at various stages of warfare. 
Russia remains politically unstable. The purposes of Vladimir Putin, although he 
has been popularly elected, remain a mystery. The chances of Russia seeking a military 
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confrontation with the West are low. However, Putin faces situations in the Caucasus, 
including Chechnya, that are still unsettled. If Russia becomes involved militarily in a 
large-scale Caucasian conflict, and that effort becomes a quagmire, Putin might feel 
compelled politically to take drastic measures to reverse the situation. 
The Caucasus presents the greatest danger for major conflict in the former Soviet 
Union. Since 1991, the nations of the region have tried to assert their independence, only 
to be subjected to renewed Russian efforts to re-impose hegemony. Russia has tried to 
couch its interference in the region in terms of legitimate interests, but its actions have 
often been undertaken in an underhanded fashion. It has failed to respect the sovereignty 
of internationally recognized states and has used brutal means to put down insurrections 
within its own borders. 
The 1994-1996 war in Chechnya was a watershed for Russia because it 
demonstrated just how far Russian power had declined. By resorting to force to subdue 
the Chechens, Moscow instead demonstrated that the use of the Russian military was no 
longer a viable option. 
The ideal situation in the Caucasus would be one in which the sovereignty of all 
states is respected and security problems are solved through international cooperative 
security organizations. Given its continued great power ambitions, Russia is an obstacle 
to establishing this state of affairs. There are a number of conflicts in the Caucasus -
including N agorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia in Georgia, and Ingushetia and Ossetia in Russia 
-that the Putin government may attempt to intervene in. 
The threat of Russia using nuclear weapons in a regional contingency is a 




these regions with a military dependent on nuclear weapons, the possibility that one of 
these hypothetical scenarios may become reality remains. The best option for NATO is 
to prevent conflict altogether by promoting cooperative security and engagement with 
Russia. However, the success of such efforts cannot be guaranteed. 
Russia's ambitions and its conventional military weakness ensure that the threat 
of miscalculation regarding the operational and strategic utility of nuclear weapons is by 
no means trivial. Given the dangers of such an eventuality, NATO must maintain its 
robust nuclear deterrent and make clear to Russia that it would have nothing to gain from 
resorting to nuclear weapons use in a regional contingency. The Alliance must make 
Russia's leaders aware of the extremely detrimental effect that such actions would have 
on its standing in the world, as well as of the grim political and possible military 
consequences. These risks must be analyzed and faced squarely if they are to be 
successfully managed- by prevention, if possible, and by remedial action, if necessary. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to advance understanding of Russian nuclear 
doctrine, particularly with regard to the possibility that it may inform Russian decision-
making in a contingency in the Caucasus. The thesis examines the state of Russian 
military reform and statements by Russian officials, military officers, and commentators 
regarding the possible employment of nuclear weapons. The political and strategic 
dynamics of the Caucasus are examined, because this region may be the setting for an 
armed conflict involving Russia that could lead to nuclear weapons use. The thesis 
concludes that NATO must find ways to prepare for such an eventuality. Options for 
conflict prevention in the Caucasus and for political-military responses should Russia 
employ nuclear weapons in the region must be developed by the Alliance. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Russia's actions towards the other former Soviet republics, referred to by 
Russians as the "Near Abroad," raise important issues in terms of U.S. political-military 
interests and commitments in Eurasia. If the security of the Euro-Atlantic region is 
indeed indivisible, a view that is espoused by NATO, the fact that certain states are 
treated as less than sovereign by their powerful neighbor calls this security into question. 
Russia seems intent on exercising a great deal of influence over several of these states, an 
ambition that raises a second important issue: the state of the Russian military posture. 
An increased reliance on nuclear weapons could lead to their employment in 
contingencies involving the Near Abroad. These nuclear contingencies are especially 
worrisome because some members of NATO (Poland, Hungary, and Turkey) physically 
border Near Abroad nations. Bringing Russia into realistic and constructive political and 
military relations with the other fonner Soviet states is one of the West's most important 
security problems. 
Russia's relations with the other former Soviet republics since 1991 have shown 
significant variations. Initially, the Commonwealth of Independent States was formed. 
However, views on what this commonwealth should be differed among the participating 
states. Russia, as the largest nation, but also the one that had lost vast stretches of Soviet 
territory, sought to keep the new states closely integrated, with common economic and 
defense policies. In contrast, Ukraine's leaders were anxious to affirm independence 
from Moscow. Relations between Kyiv and Moscow have been testy, especially dealing 
with such delicate issues as nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet. Russia has 
continually sought the protection of ethnic Russians living in the "Near Abroad" states, 
and this has been an especially sensitive issue in the Baltic states. Belarus has sought to 
become closer to Moscow, but many Russians fear that it may become a parasitic partner 
(a fear which speaks volumes about the disastrous state of affairs in Belarus). Russia has 
also played a major role in the disturbances in Moldova. Relations with the Muslim 
republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia have been more problematic, notably with the 
troubles in Nagomo-Karabakh. Chechnya, it is important to note, is internationally 
recognized as a part of the Russian Federation. The situation in the Caspian Sea Basin is 
worrisome for several reasons, including the potential spread oflslamic fundamentalism; 
the region attracts international attention because of its energy resources. 
During the same period, Russia's conventional military capability has declined 
dramatically. The army that was once dreaded by the West showed its ineptness during 
the disastrous war in Chechnya in 1994-1996. Attempts at military reform have to this 
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point been unsuccessful, and the Russian military posture has shifted ominously toward 
greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Events in Chechnya since September 1999 show 
that Russia will continue to use force to support its definition of state interests, especially 
in the northern Caucasus. The great concern here is that because Russia's great power 
aspirations do not match its conventional military capabilities, it may become embroiled 
in another quagmire, which could in extreme circumstances lead it to use nuclear forces. 
This eventuality seems to be most plausible in the Caucasus region, given the recent 
history of open conflict. 
To set the scene for an analysis of possible Russian decision-making in a nuclear 
crisis in the "Near Abroad," this thesis examines the evolution of Soviet nuclear weapons 
doctrine and its continuity with the subsequent Russian doctrine. Statements and writings 
by Russian officials and commentators are used to analyze the implications of the new 
nuclear weapons policy. The thesis also analyzes the possibilities for continued conflict 
involving Russia in the Caucasus. The implications of these developments for Western 
security are then examined. It is clear that all states in the Caucasus must be examined 
separately, because of the disparity in their historical experiences and current situations-
economic, political, and military. 
The thesis also offers an analysis of courses of action the West might take to help 
ensure that the Caucasus does not become an area of military conflict between Russia and 
the Alliance. All actions must ensure that these new nations are left free to pursue their 
own futures without Russian interference. Encouraging economic recovery and political 
transformation will help to make these new nations strong and viable. This is not to say 
that it would be unnatural for these states to have positive and constructive relations with 
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Russia. However, their internationally recognized independence must be upheld. Russia 
also must be discouraged from thinking that the use of nuclear weapons would be a real 
option in contingencies in the Caucasus. Russia is not now a great power and has lost 
many lands that were under its dominion even in pre-Soviet times. It appears to be a state 
on the verge of complete chaos, with little immediate hope of emerging as a peer of the 
West. Much of the country's future will therefore be determined by what happens in 
Russia itself. The period of uncertainty and instability at hand will require much vigilance 
on the part of the nations of the Atlantic Alliance, if their security and that of other 
countries in the Euro-Atlantic region is to be maintained. 
Finally, in view of the possibility that Russian nuclear use contingencies could 
arise in extreme circumstances in the Caucasus, the thesis also examines potential NATO 
responses. In other words, while preventing such contingencies is imperative, the success 
of prevention efforts cannot be guaranteed. The United States and its NATO allies must 
therefore examine response options to be prepared for the eventuality of such crises. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE 
The research methodology used in the thesis consists of an analysis of primary 
and secondary sources. Statements by Russian officials and analysts and authoritative 
articulations of Russian military doctrine are analyzed as primary sources. Scholarly 
articles by Russian and Western experts are used as secondary sources. Various 
electronic media are utilized, including Internet resources such as Lexis-Nexis, the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and other websites·dedicated to Russian affairs. 
Scholarly journals and books written by leading experts in the field are also used. 
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Chapter II examines the evolution of Soviet nuclear doctrine. This examination 
focuses on the ideological and historical underpinnings of Soviet nuclear doctrine and the 
historical evolution of this doctrine from Stalin through Gorbachev. Special attention is 
given to the Soviet views on deterrence, escalation and warfighting. This establishes the 
background for an analysis of current Russian nuclear doctrine. 
Chapter III assesses the state of the Russian military since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. This includes an examination of the precipitous decline of 
Russia's conventional military capability and efforts at military reform. The change in 
Russia's nuclear posture is analyzed. Statements by Russian political officials and 
Russian officers are studied to gain an understanding of current Russian views about the 
operational use of nuclear weapons. 
Chapter IV examines the strategic situation in the Caucasus. International and 
domestic political dynamics in this troubled region since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
are considered, as well as the underlying causes of conflict. The strategic interests of 
Russia in the region are investigated with the purpose of identifying the possibilities for 
future conflict involving Russia in the Caucasus. Finally, possible Russian nuclear use 
scenarios are outlined. 
Chapter V offers conclusions based on an examination ofNATO's options for 
conflict prevention in the Caucasus. This chapter also assesses the Alliance's response 
options should these prevention efforts fail - that is, what could NATO do if Russia 
actually employed nuclear weapons in a Caucasian conflict? This analysis includes an 
overview of the likely implications of Russian nuclear weapons use for international 
politics. 
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II: THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no military issue was more important to Western planners during the 
Cold War than Soviet nuclear doctrine. Given the immense destructive power of arsenals 
on each side, the dangers of miscalculating the opponent's intentions and policies were 
very grave indeed. In view of the large library of existing literature on the subject, this 
thesis relies on a survey of writings by Soviet and Western scholars to distill and examine 
the important facets of Soviet strategy. The historical and ideological underpinnings of 
Soviet doctrine are examined, with the goal of establishing how the thought processes of 
Soviet planning came about. This chapter includes a briefhistory of Soviet nuclear 
strategy from Stalin through Gorbachev, a comparison of the Soviet view of nuclear 
deterrence with that ofthe United States, and an examination of Soviet views on nuclear 
warfighting. This includes the use of both theater and strategic nuclear weapons and 
Soviet views on the process of escalation. This background is intended to set the scene 
for an analysis of contemporary Russian nuclear doctrine and its relevance to potential 
crises in the Caucasus. The historical examination of Soviet nuclear doctrine serves as a 
historical basis to examine continuities and discontinuities with current Russian nuclear 
doctrine. 
B. IDEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES 
Soviet views on the nature and conduct of war differed significantly from those in 
the West. Western views on war had their genesis in the Enlightenment and in the belief 
that rational human beings could control war and violence. Russia had much less 
exposure to the Enlightenment, and its views of international relations tended to 
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subscribe more to the Hobbesian view of anarchy. Moreover, owing to Lenin's 
enthusiasm for Clausewitz, Soviet military thought was partly based on the writings of 
Clausewitz. That is, war is not a scientific game, nor an international sport, but is at base 
an act ofviolence.1 Two Clausewitzian dictums- that "war has its grammar but not its 
own logic," and that "war is a continuation of politics by other (i.e. more violent) means" 
- came to be especially important to Soviet thinkers.2 
Marxist theory dictated that the class struggle dominated all interactions between 
states. This class struggle defmed politics and policy. Clausewitz's theorem that war is a 
tool of policy thus fit very well with the Marxist desire to bring about a final victory in 
the class struggle. In other words, war would be the ultimate deciding factor in the 
struggle between socialism and imperialism. The Clausewitzian dictum that war is 
ultimately about prevailing in an act of violence found an early supporter in Engels. 
Fighting is to war what cash payment is to trade, for however rarely it may 
be necessary for it actually to occur, everything is directed towards it, and 
eventually it must take place all the same, and must be decisive. 3 
Western concepts of limited war and mutual assured destruction (MAD) were not 
viewed favorably by Soviet military thinkers. In their view, war was an enterprise to be 
avoided if possible. However, this could not be guaranteed. According to communist 
ideological precepts, socialism would inevitably triumph and the capital~st imperialists 
would seek to aggressively stem the tide of socialism. Therefore, the ideology held, the 
Soviet Union had to be prepared to fight and win wars. This thinking combined the 
military teaching of Clausewitz with the worldview of Hobbes. Imperialism was 
1 Roman Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Union: The Elusive Adversary," The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, ed. 
by Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986), 5. 
2 Clausewitz, quoted in ibid., 5. 
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considered the source of all wars, and thus the superpower relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union was replete with irreconcilable differences.4 Any war 
between the USSR and the West would have been the third and decisive conflict between 
socialism and imperialism (the first having been the Russian Revolution and the second 
World War II).5 Such a war could not come to a "just" conclusion, Soviet ideologists 
held, without the ultimate socialist victory over imperialism. Nuclear weapons had 
sufficient power to bring about such a decisive result. 
The chief historical influence on Soviet strategic thought was the Second World 
War, or the Great Patriotic War in Soviet parlance. This is certainly understandable 
given the immense amount of suffering inflicted on the Soviets during the war. Most 
accounts of World War II that Americans are exposed to do not do justice to the enormity 
of the war on the Eastern Front. The war between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia 
was unprecedented in terms of sheer scale. Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic states and 
large stretches of European Russia were occupied and devastated by the fighting. Twenty 
million Soviet citizens lost their lives. The Soviets were determined to prevent such an 
occurrence from ever happening again. 
Three basic historical conclusions were taken away from the Great Patriotic War 
by the Soviets. First, the Soviet Union, because of the sacrifices it made, emerged from 
the war stronger politically, economically, morally, and militarily. As an editorial in the 
Soviet journal Military Thought stated in 1967, 
3 Engels, quoted in ibid., 6. 
4 Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Contemporary Soviet Military Policy," The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, 
1986,28. 
5 William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Military Policy Since World War II (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1986), 27. 
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The victory of the Soviet people and their armed forces over the strike 
forces of international imperialism is of worldwide historical importance. 
The victory created favorable conditions for the development of socialist 
revolutions in the countries of Europe and Asia and the success of the 
national liberation struggle of peoples against the colonial yoke. All this 
led to the serious weakening of the positions of imperialism and reaction 
to the strengthening and growth of the international forces of socialism 
and democracy.6 
The second conclusion was that the socialist system could not be defeated by the 
forces of imperialism. Third, the rapid economic recovery of the USSR from the 
devastation of war was proof of the superiority of the socialist economic system.7 These 
Soviet conclusions ignored the contributions of the Western Allies in defeating Hitler just 
as much as some Western accounts tended to de-emphasize the magnitude of the Soviet-
German war. 
C. SOVIET STRATEGY UNDER STALIN 
The initial postwar strategic response by the Soviets to the American nuclear 
monopoly was to pretend to ignore it. This served both ideological and practical 
functions. To panic or relent in the face of an American nuclear monopoly would be to 
give up on an important ideological principle in the struggle between imperialism and 
socialism. The ultimate victory of socialism over imperialism was regarded as a 
historical inevitability. Stalin could certainly not allow this central tenet of communism 
to be undone by some new sort of technical gadgetry.8 Stalin, fresh from a devastating 
war against National Socialist Germany, now had to be concerned by the emergence of a 
new Anglo-American threat that was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons. 
Downplaying the significance of the American nuclear arsenal also had the effect of 
6 From an editorial "A Great Half Century," Military Thought, no. 10, (October 1967), quoted in ibid., 25. 
7 Lee and Staar, 25. 
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preserving Soviet morale and showing that the Soviet Union would not be intimidated in 
negotiations by the American nuclear monopoly.9 
Soviet military doctrine under Stalin was based on his concept of "permanently 
operating factors." These were the stability of the rear, the morale ofthe troops, the 
quantity and quality of divisions, the army's weapons, and the organizational ability of 
the military command personnel.10 While Stalin was alive, these would be the 
undisputed truths of Soviet military thinking. The element of surprise was conspicuously 
absent from this list of factors. Strategic surprise was seen only as a "transitory factor" 
that the imperialists would unsuccessfully use to try to offset their inferiority in numbers. 
The chiefbasis for this was the experience ofBarbarossa in 1941. Here the Germans had 
the great advantage of strategic surprise, but nonetheless ultimately lost. This was a 
convenient interpretation for Stalin since he was responsible for the Soviets being taken 
so completely by surprise. This was translated into postwar Soviet thinking in that the 
West was accused of planning to use nuclear weapons in a manner similar to the German 
use of Blitzkrieg. Even though Stalin acknowledged that an American atomic assault 
might kill tens or hundreds of thousands of his citizens, the American atomic threat was 
mocked as an "atomic Blitzkrieg."11 Soviet propaganda was also quick to accuse the 
West of immorality by threatening the use of atomic weapons: 
The revival ofDouhet's venturous ideas by the Anglo-American warlords 
mirrors their aspirations of conquest. Not having reliable reserves of 
manpower at their disposal and searching for obedient cannon fodder in 
the Marshallized countries, the warmongers boom and exaggerate the role 
of the Air Force out of all proportion. These venturous schemes are also 
8 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, second edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1989), 58. 
9 1bid. 
10 Andrei Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-1991 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 112. 
11 Ibid., 113. 
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based on the calculation that the peoples of the USSR and the People's 
Democracies will be intimidated by the so-called 'atomic' or 'push-
button' war. These ideas emanate from the completely distorted view that 
the outcome of a war can be settled by one kind of weapon alone. History 
has proved the reverse more than once. 12 
As already mentioned, such statements were in large part intended to deflect 
attention from the fact that the United States possessed a monopoly over nuclear 
weapons. This changed, of course, with the detonation of the first Soviet bomb in 1949. 
The de-emphasizing of nuclear weapons under Stalin also had some basis in military fact. 
The huge Red Army was of great value in securing the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. 
Until the advent ofmassive arsenals ofthermonuclearweapons in the late 1950s, the new 
devices were not destructive or numerous enough to be the decisive factor in a war 
between the Soviets and the West. 13 The recognition that nuclear weapons had 
fundamentally altered the face of warfare would not come during Stalin's reign. Even 
after the Soviets detonated their atomic and thermonuclear weapons, they were not 
emphasized as major factors in military thought. Even as late as 1954, the introduction of 
nuclear weapons into large-scale military exercises brought about no major changes in 
military thinking.14 
D. STRATEGY UNDER KHRUSHCHEV 
Josef Stalin died in March 1953. In September of that year an article appeared in 
the journal Military Thought by Major General Nikolai Talensky that signaled a change 
in Soviet thinking. His article argued for a scientific approach to the study of warfare that 
was not based on Marxist political and economic theory. Stalin's "permanently operating 
12 Marshal of Aviation Vershinin, cited in 1949, cited in Freedman, 1989,61. "Marshallized countries" 
referred to those Western European countries that had accepted U.S. aid under the Marshall Plan. 
13 Freedman, 1989, 61. 




factors" were also demoted in importance. Talensky underscored the potential 
importance of surprise in a nuclear war, which Stalin had regarded as a merely transitory 
factor. 15 When Marshal Georgi Zhukov ascended to the post ofMinister of Defense in 
1955, he helped to further this change in thinking. An article by General P. A. 
Rotmistrov emphasizing surprise was a further indication that Soviet military thought 
was radically changing. 
Surprise attack, employing atomic and hydrogen weapons and other 
modem means of conflict, now takes on new forms and is capable of 
leading to significantly greater results than in the past war ... Surprise 
attack with the massive employment of new weapons can cause the rapid 
collapse of a government whose capacity to resist is low as a consequence 
of radical faults in its social and economic structure and also as a 
consequence of an unfavorable geographic position.16 
This showed a growing move in Soviet thinking towards the logic of preemptive 
attacks. Nuclear weapons were seen as an essential tool for deterring the West from 
attacking the Soviet Union. If this deterrence failed, however, a surprise preemptive 
attack would be the Soviet Union's best chance to limit its damage. The fact that 
Rotmistrov appears to be suggesting the possibility of such attacks against counter-value 
civilian targets reflects the military reality of that time. The Soviet arsenal of the time 
was neither sufficiently large nor accurate enough to make a counter-force strategy 
realistic. 17 
Since surprise emerged as a crucial factor in military thinking, there was an 
increased emphasis on the importance of the initial period of war. Much of this was again 
drawn from Soviet experiences in World War II. The German attack had failed in the 
15 Freedman, 1989, 145 
16 Rotmistorv, quoted in ibid., 150 
17 Ibid. 
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Soviet view because it did not meet its objectives in the initial period. Because the 
Wehrmacht was unable to completely destroy Soviet resistance in the opening months of 
the campaign, its ultimate fate was sealed. 18 The advent of nuclear weapons and the 
means of delivering them rapidly over intercontinental ranges meant that the initial period 
would be even more critical in a future war. 
Special significance in nuclear rocket war is acquired by the beginning 
period. The importance of this period is that the first mass nuclear attack 
in great measure predetermines all the following course of the war ... The 
results of using nuclear weapons miFt be so effective that the aims of the 
war will be achieved in this period. 1 -
In January 1960, Nikita Khrushchev declared that there had been a revolution in 
military affairs (RMA). Technical advances, in particular the advent of the ICBM, had 
given nuclear weapons a preeminent role in warfare. The strategic rocket forces were 
emphasized, and the ground forces, the traditional source of Russian power, were reduced 
in size.20 In Khrushchev's view, "both gigantic military coalitions will deploy massive 
armies in a future decisive world war; all modem, powerful and long-range means of 
combat, including multi-megaton nuclear rocket weapons, will be used in it on a huge 
scale."21 
The nuc~ear RMA was more fully defined by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky in his 
1962 work Military Strategy. The work appeared to be a compromise among various 
schools of thought on nuclear matters. Some passages suggested that a future war would 
18 This view is developed at great length in S.P. Ivanov, The Initial Period of War (Washington: U.S. 
GovernmentPrinting Office, 1986). This book was published in the USSR in 1974 and translated and 
published in the United States in 1986. 
19 Colonel S.V. Malyanchikov, "The Character and Features ofNuclear Rocket War," The Nuclear 
Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, ed. by William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), 177. 
20 David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 188. 
21 Khrushchev, quoted in ibid., 189. 
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be short, while others implied that it would be long. The inevitability of escalation from 
a limited to a global war was also unclear. There was also a contradiction between the 
significance attributed to the initial period of nuclear missile attacks and the importance 
ascribed to conventional forces in the final period. 22 Sokolovsky' s work also related 
nuclear weapons to the conventional operational art. Nuclear weapons could be used, 
Sokolovsky wrote, to punch holes in an enemy's front lines to allow mechanized forces 
to follow through. It was assumed that nuclear arms would be used against strategic 
targets and tactical targets on the battlefield. Sokolovsky stated that "the main means of 
destruction in operational large units of all types of armed forces are rocket-nuclear 
weapons. "23 
Khrushchev felt obliged to take measures to compensate for the missile gap in the 
early 1960s between the Soviet Union and the United States. Owing to Sputnik and the 
first Soviet ICBM tests, Soviet deception efforts, and other factors, the "missile gap" was 
widely believed in the United States in 1957-1961 to favor Moscow. Khrushchev 
emphasized the risk that was held over the NATO countries of Europe by Soviet forces 
with the goal of undermining the cohesion ofthe Alliance and the credibility of U.S. 
extended deterrence. He also emphasized the destructive power of thermonuclear 
weapons and made declarations that any war would not stay limited. 24 The U.S. 
superiority in nuclear weapons necessitated, the Soviets argued, either a preemptive 
doctrine or a launch on warning doctrine. It appears that the latter option was pursued. 
As Marshal N. Krylov, commander of the SRF, stated in 1967: 
22 Freedman, 1989, 264. 
23 Sokolovsky quoted in Glantz, 1992, 193. 
24 Freedman, 1989,267. 
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With the presence in the armament of troops oflaunchers and missiles 
which are completely ready for operation, as well as systems for detecting 
enemy missile launchers and other types of reconnaissance, an aggressor 
is no longer able to suddenly destroy the missiles before their launch on 
the territory of the country against which the aggression is committed. 
They will have time during the flight of the missiles of the aggressor to 
leave their launchers and inflict a retaliatory strike against the enemy?5 
Khrushchev's other response to U.S. nuclear superiority was to attempt a quick 
fix by basing IRBMs in Cuba in 1962. This would give the Soviets a way to easily 
threaten the eastern United States and complicate U.S. war plans. UnfortUnately for 
Khrushchev, the United States discovered the missiles before they were operational and 
was able to use its nuclear superiority to back Khrushchev into a comer. This humiliation 
would be one of several factors that would lead to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964.26 
E. STRATEGYUNDERBREZHNEV 
After Khrushchev fell, the Soviet military moved to encourage an arms buildup 
that would bring the Soviet Union to parity with the United States in strategic weapons. 
Many senior military officers felt that Khrushchev had lost his nerve during the Cuban 
missile crisis, and rejected General Talensky' s views that it was a "dangerous illusion 
that the idea of thermonuclear war can still serve as an instrument of politics, that it is 
possible to achieve political aims by using nuclear weapons and still survive."27 Another 
Soviet writer stated that ''to maintain that victory in nuclear war is in general impossible 
would not be only untrue theoretically but dangerous from a political point ofview."28 
As Soviet capabilities grew, the USSR's doctrinal emphasis on surprise and the initial 
25 Krylov quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual deterrence and strategic anns limitations in Soviet 
Policy," International Security, III:1 Summer 1978, in ibid., 267. 
26 Ibid., 268. 
27 Talensky, quoted in ibid., 269. 
28 Lt. Colonel Ye. I. Ribkin, "On the Nature of World Nuclear Rocket War," The Nuclear Revolution in 
Soviet Military Affairs, 1968, 113. 
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period of war caused even more concern in the West that the USSR was assembling a 
force for warfighting, not merely for deterrence. 
The doctrine of the inevitability of any war quickly becoming a global 
thermonuclear war began to change in the second half of the 1960s. The decade 1957-
1967 had also seen a similar shift in NATO strategy towards the doctrine of "flexible 
response" and away from the doctrine of"massive retaliation." The Soviet development 
ofiCBMs to threaten the United States and the 1958-1962 Berlin Crisis played large 
roles in this evolution.29 Soviet writers began to focus more closely on operational art, 
reviving such pre-World War II concepts as deep battle and deep operations. 
Sokolovsky's earlier statements about nuclear war became more qualified. For example, 
in a later edition of his book, he stated that "the decisive role will be played by nuclear 
weapons: the other means of armed combat will utilize the results of nu~lear strikes for 
the final defeat ofthe enemy."30 Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the return to 
the study of operational art and conventional warfare continued. Ground forces, reduced 
in size in the 1960s, grew throughout the next two decades. 31 
As far as the problem of nuclear warfare was concerned, the Soviets faced 
questions of how to avoid, preempt, or conduct it. They relied on nuclear retaliatory 
capabilities to avoid it. At the same time, they sought to use political means, like the 
nuclear freeze movement, nuclear-weapons-free zones, and a no-first-use policy to 
weaken public support for nuclear deterrence in NATO countries .. 
29 DavidS. Yost, "The History ofNATO Theater Nuclear Force Policy: Key Findings of the Sandia 
Conference," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, June 1992, pp. 228-261,230. 
30 Sokolovsky, quoted in Glantz, 1992,199. 
31 Ibid., 205. 
17 
In short, during Brezhnev' s rule ( 1964-1982) Soviet military thinking underwent 
a change back towards an emphasis on conventional means of combat, although it was a 
period of massive buildups in both conventional and nuclear forces. The strain that this 
. buildup put on the Soviet system would be a major driving factor behind changes under 
Gorbachev. 
F. GORBACHEV AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he inherited a Soviet state that 
possessed massive conventional and nuclear firepower, but also a crippled economy that 
was beginning to undermine the sustainability of communist rule. He used his policy of 
glasnost to help usher in a new period of detente with the West. Soviet military strategy 
followed suit in this period. In 1987, the Soviets announced that their military doctrine 
was purely defensive. This declaration, along with Gorbachev's United Nations speech 
in December 1988, ended any public Soviet discussion of operational or strategic 
offensives. 32 However, contrary to public rhetoric, Soviet operational plans until 1989 
called for an extensive use of nuclear weapons in a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. 33 
Military plans notwithstanding, the Soviets were rapidly moving into a period of relaxed 
tensions and arms reductions. This coincided with the peaceful collapse of the Eastern 
European satellite empire in 1989 and the eventual breakup of the SovietUnion in 1991. 
G. SOVIET VIEWS ON DETERRENCE 
This portion of the thesis examines Soviet views on subjects such as deterrence, 
warfighting, escalation, and victory. The views of the Soviets on deterrence are a useful 
32 Ibid., 212. 
33 Lothar Ruehl, "Offensive defence in the Warsaw Pact," Su,_;,ival, Vol. XXXIII, No.5, September-
October 1991, pp.442-450. This article examines East German documents related toW arsaw Pact war 
plans that were obtained by NATO upon German reunification in 1990. 
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area to begin with since deterrence was the basis for the nuclear balance. The Soviets 
saw deterrence as a one-sided proposition. That is, it was perfectly desirable for the 
Soviet Union to deter the aggressive imperialist forces ofthe world, but not necessary for 
the Soviet Union itself to be deterred. This outlook had its roots in the Marxist 
ideological proposition that socialism is on the right side of history, and thus destined for 
ultimate victory. In Soviet thinking, deterrence was based on three elements: the 
correlation of economic, political and societal forces; military doctrine and strategy; and 
the military balance of forces. 34 The aggressive nature of imperialism would lead it to 
attempt to stem the tide of socialism by warfare if it was not deterred. It was deemed 
possible and desirable for the Soviet Union to gain military superiority over the West to 
convince it that any aggression would fail. 
Similarly, the Soviets rejected the U.S. notion of mutual assured destruction 
(MAD). They believed that such theories abandoned leadership responsibility and 
instead sought to base the USSR's nuclear strategy on denial rather than punishment. 
The United States would be better deterred if denied a credible war option by the Soviet 
Union. Soviet planners therefore developed a strategy to fight and prevail in a nuclear 
war. They believed that the force most capable of dominating events in case of war would 
be the source of greatest leverage during peace. 35 
In contrast, strategic thinking in the United States came to depend on Albert 
Wohlstetter's theory of a "delicate balance of terror" in which deterrence based on 
survivable second-strike forces was a mutual proposition, with each side refraining from 
entering a war that it knew it could not win. Since neither side saw any advantage in 
34 Lee and Staar, 1986, 24. 
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starting such a war, the theory held, MAD was a source of stability. Ever since Robert 
McNamara explored the viability of a counterforce strategy in the early 1960s, U.S. 
thinking has been based on the general disbelief that a nuclear war is winnable. 36 It is 
worth noting that these different views on deterrence are not necessarily incompatible. In 
both views, the United States has no desire or reason to launch a nuclear war, so such a 
war is deterred. This equation would have changed, however, if the Soviets ever came to 
believe that the "correlation of forces" was either decisively in their favor or against 
them. In the first case, the Soviets might have felt compelled to launch a war for the final 
overthrow of imperialism. In the latter, more dangerous case, they might have launched a 
preemptive strike because they believed the West was about to attack. This was 
somewhat the case in the early 1980s when Operation VRY AN was launched by the 
KGB to determine if just such an eventuality was about to come to fruition. 37 The 
Soviets feared that the United States would use its Pershing II missiles in Europe to 
launch a decapitating first strike. This paranoia was increased by the strident rhetoric of 
the Reagan Administration and by the general U.S. arms buildup. 
H. W ARFIGHTING AND ESCALATION 
The Soviets developed a warfighting doctrine that identified several key 
requirements for successfully prosecuting a nuclear war. The first of these was a 
survivable command and control capability.38 In a system involving such militarily, 
politically and symbolically important weapons, the system of command and control 
35 Lambeth in The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, 1986,29. 
36 Freedman, 1989, 245-56. 
37 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, ed., Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 67-90. 
38 Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms (London: Westview Press, 
1984), 67. 
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must be reliable and robust. There must be a delicate balance between positive and 
negative control over the forces. If too tightly controlled, they would be too inflexible to 
employ under combat conditions; if too loosely controlled, an unacceptable risk of an 
accidental or unauthorized use could arise. The command and control nodes would 
naturally be primary targets of an enemy's attack, so all possible means must be taken to 
ensure their survival. 
The Soviets appeared to be morbidly afraid of the possibility that the United 
States would launch a decapitating first strike, removing the possibility of swift 
retaliation. Operation VRY AN in the early 1980s was in large part prompted by this fear 
and accentuated by the deployment of U.S. Pershing II missiles to Europe. The primary 
reaction plan to a massive attack was a launch-on-warning posture; the first missiles of 
the retaliatory strike would leave their silos before the first impact of U.S. missiles. 
Soviet planners ran computer simulations that seemed to confirm this as the only option; 
such simulations showed the danger of a decapitating first strike and strategic paralysis. 39 
As characterized by Alexei Arbatov, the posture was "the one-sided Soviet 
strategy which relied exclusively on the launch-on-warning principle."40 This had its 
ultimate evolution in the so-called "dead hand" system. In that scenario, if a possible 
surprise attack were detected towards Moscow (from a U.S. ballistic missile submarine or 
a Pershing II, the most likely instruments in the Soviet analysis), the Soviet command 
authority could send a preliminary launch message to order massive and rapid retaliation 
if it was confirmed that command from Moscow was lost. This retaliatory strike would 
39 See Bruce G. Blair "Russian Control of Nuclear Weapons," The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the 
New States of Eurasia, ed. by George Quester (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpre, 1995), 73. 
40 Arbatov, quoted in Blair, 1995,73. 
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have been launched by a crew in a command bunker if a preliminary message had been 
received, communications with the national command authority had been lost, and there 
was evidence of nuclear detonations.41 This "dead hand" system appears to have been 
akin to the "doomsday device" suggested in the film Dr. Strangelove. 
The second chief requirement is the aforementioned element of surprise. 42 The 
third is the ability to conduct combined arms operations in a nuclear battlefield. As 
already discussed, this evolved out of the nuclear RMA of Khrushchev's time. Such 
operations present the problem of conflicting requirements. Conventional battles require 
massed and concentrated firepower, whereas nuclear operations require the dispersal of 
forces to increase their survivability. The Soviet response to this problem was to plan to 
attack Western Europe along a single axis in order to rapidly exploit the USSR's own 
tactical strikes. As Soviet Colonel I. Liutov stated, it was necessary to concentrate "main 
efforts on a main axis, and particularly the bulk of nuclear firepower, as well as in rapid 
exploitation by the troops of the results of nuclear strikes."43 Following this exploitation, 
the forces must then be able to maneuver and disperse so as not to be vulnerable to 
enemy nuclear strikes.44 Despite Soviet pronouncements about no-first-use, this 
operational doctrine is fitted to a posture of first use. 
Strategic defense was the final major requirement in Soviet plans for nuclear 
warfighting. This can be grouped into five facets. 45 The first is ballistic missile defense 
41 See Blair, 1995, and Valeri Yarynich, "The Doomsday Machine's Safety Catch," The New York Times, 1 
February 1994, available through Lexis-Nexis. Mr. Blair had initially suggested that the system was 
completely automatic, but Mr. Yarynich (a retired SRF officer) clarified that human operators were still 
necessary to send the final launch message. 
42 Liutov quoted in Laird and Herspring, 1984, 69. 
43 Ibid., 72. 
44 Ibid. 
45 The following discussion paraphrased from ibid., 74. 
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(BMD). In 1972 the ABM Treaty was signed, limiting each side to two strategic BMD 
sites. The U.S. system came into being briefly, but was closed down almost at once. In 
contrast, the Soviets maintained an operational system around Moscow. The second facet 
is anti-submarine warfare. From a Soviet perspective, one of the missions of the USSR's 
fast-attack submarines was to hunt down and destroy U.S. Fleet Ballistic Missile 
submarines. The third form is strategic air defense against strategic bombers. The USSR 
had an extensive system to protect its vast territory. The fourth and fifth forms of 
strategic defense are largely passive. One is to conceal and disperse important military 
and industrial sites to make them harder to target. The final facet is civil defense for the 
government and the civilian population, for which numerous deep underground shelters 
were built. 
Closely related to warfighting were the Soviet perceptions about the nature of 
escalation in a major war. Soviet planning sought escalation dominance, so the United . 
States could not gain any advantage by escalating the war along the various steps to an 
all-out exchange. Soviet declaratory policy about the inevitability of any limited nuclear 
exchange escalating to an all-out global war was probably intended to serve deterrence as 
well as diplomatic purposes. As Nathan Leites, an analyst with the RAND Corporation, 
stated: 
It is perhaps just because the Soviets are so interested in the distinction 
between deterrence and warfighting that they have kept silent about it. The 
war not being yet begun, this is the hour of deterrence: deterrence by the 
prospect of a maximum initial strike, of preemption, and of the none-or-all 
character of nuclear war. Once the war is on, the Authorities may adopt 
that "controlled" conduct about which the West (in a possible Soviet 
estimate) is now so prematurely chattering. 46 
46 Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War (New York: Crane, Rusak & Company, 1982), 379. 
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It is probable that the Soviets envisioned several phases from tactical nuclear use 
all the way up to a full-blown exchange with the United States. At the theater level, the 
Soviets would have probably used theater nuclear forces (TNF) for both political and 
military purposes. One political goal was to undermine the cohesion of the NATO 
Alliance. There were always European fears about the credibility of U.S. extended 
deterrence, and Soviet strategy attempted to exploit these fears. The USSR could have 
used its TNF against targets in Europe and declared that U.S. and Soviet territory were 
"sanctuaries" that would not be struck as long as both sides respected this principle. By 
this logic, the United States would have been encouraged to respond with its own TNF 
exclusively within the non-Soviet portions of the Warsaw Pact or on the battlefield in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and in other NATO European countries. The 
pressure on the United States from Moscow in this case would have been strongly against 
reprisal attacks on the Soviet Union, but U.S. and NATO policy during the Cold War 
always rejected the Soviet notion that Soviet territory should be regarded as a sanctuary. 
Indeed, the FRG was the strongest proponent in NATO Europe of forcing the Soviets to 
reckon with the full spectrum of escalation, including strikes against the USSR with U.S. 
strategic forces. 
Soviet TNF might also have been employed at a slightly higher level of escalation 
against strategic-theater targets like NATO command posts, nuclear weapons storage 
sites, and airfields. This was the probable strategy, especially if the Soviets wished to 
limit the possible damage that a NATO TNF strike could inflict. This strategy might 
have been taken a step further with the use of either TNF or the strategic rocket forces 
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(SRF) in a counterforce attack against vulnerable British and French strategic forces 
(SSBN bases, bomber bases, and French IRBMs ). 47 
A further level of escalation might have involved strategic maneuvers that, while 
not directly attacking the U.S. homeland, would have sought to demonstrate to the United 
States the dangers of further resistance. These maneuvers might have included a 
demonstration of Soviet intent by effecting a large-scale urban evacuation, or by placing 
all of the USSR's strategic forces at the highest levels of alert. Anti-satellite capabilities 
could have been utilized to disable U.S. early warning and communications systems.48 It 
is important to remember that at all of these levels of escalation, the Soviets would have 
sought leverage to coerce the United States and NATO into accepting Soviet demands. 
From here the nuclear exchanges would probably have escalated into strikes 
against the U.S. and Soviet homelands. The most important targets for the Soviets would 
have included U.S. ICBM silos, strategic bomber bases, early-warning systems, and 
command and control nodes.49 At the stage of a limited attack, the Soviets might have 
sought to attack a sampling of some or all of these critical targets. Exchanges in this 
phase of escalation might have also included urban-industrial centers, with the intention 
of demonstrating the seriousness of the situation. A further variant of this strategy one 
step up the escalatory ladder would have been a massive counterforce strike aimed at 
eliminating as many of the aforementioned critical targets as possible. 50 The step up 
from the previous two levels of escalation would have been significant, because the 
intention would have been not a demonstration of will, but gaining a massive military 
47 Ibid., 77. 
48 1bid., 78 
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advantage. Moving up to this step would have been problematical for the Soviets 
because they knew that the United States would have been able to launch a massive 
retaliatory strike, especially ifU.S. strategic forces were at a heightened level of alert. 51 
The importance of surprise in Soviet thinking should be recalled in this regard. The 
Soviets might have reasoned that it would be desirable for them to skip several rungs on 
the ladder of escalation in order to gain the greatest military advantage. 
Following a massive counterforce attack the options of either limited or massive 
countervalue attacks against U.S. urban and industrial centers would have remained, 
assuming that U.S. retaliatory strikes had not neutralized Soviet command and control 
capabilities. This would have been the Armageddon MAD scenario that rational planners 
would have hoped to avoid, but events could have spiraled out of control to such an 
eventuality. In targeting for this scenario, Soviet planners examined the American 
economy to determine what the most advantageous targets would be 'to prevent 
regeneration of U.S. fighting capabilities. These appeared to include power grids, oil 
refineries, and important industrial nodes (steel, chemicals, and defense factories). 
Another goal would have been to attack the political organs that would be needed for a 
reconstitution of civil order. 52 In such a scenario, it is assumed that the Soviets, having 
suffered comparable damage, would seek to create a situation in which their 
reconstitution and regeneration capabilities would have been better than those of the 
United States. 
49 Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Roeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War (Stanford, CA: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 75-80. 
50 Laird and Herspring, 1984,79. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Douglass and Roeber, 1979, 85-87. 
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What were the Soviet concepts of victory in a nuclear war at any level of 
escalation? According to Soviet ideology, a nuclear war would have amounted to a 
military operation, certainly one with a potentially greater degree of destruction than any 
in human history, but not one completely devoid of strategic meaning. 53 In keeping with 
the Clausewitzian definition ofwar, the logical first objective of Soviet strategy was the 
defeat of enemy armed forces and military potential. The phrase "military potential" is 
ambiguous as it suggests that such attacks would not be purely of the couriterforce 
variety. As one Soviet officer stated: 
For the achievement of victory in a present-day nuclear war, if it is 
unleashed by the imperialists, not only the enemy's armed forces, but also 
sources of his military power, the important economic centers, and also 
points of military and state control as well as the areas where different 
branches of armed forces are based, will be subjected to simultaneous 
destruction. 54 
Once the armed forces of imperialism were defeated, Soviet ideology held, the 
triumphant march of socialism would be able to proceed. The next step in pursuing this 
goal would have been to seize strategic areas that would give the Soviets additional 
military and political leverage. These might have included critical naval chokepoints, 
industrial areas, and oil-producing regions. 55 The seizure of all of these objectives would 
have gained the Soviets further advantages on their way to eventual victory. The Soviet 
ideology of victory dictated that enemy territories would have been occupied and 
converted to socialist states. 56 This would have been especially important in Europe, in 
-order to deny imperialist forces any land areas contiguous to the Soviet sphere. It is 
53 Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," Soviet Military Thinking, ed. 
by Derek Leebaert (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1981 ), 56. 
54 Colonel M. Shirokov, "The Question of Influences on the Military and Economic Potential of Warring 
States," Voyennaya Mysl, 1968 no. 5, quoted in Douglass and Roeber, 1979, 16. 
55 Ibid., 21. 
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unclear whether the Soviets ever realistically thought of an invasion of the United States, 
or whether they assumed it would come into the socialist fold as a result of its defeat by 
Soviet ground forces in Europe and by the SRF in the U.S. homeland. Speculation about 
Soviet planning at this point becomes quite fanciful, because, if the phrase MAD was 
truly an accurate portrayal of the results of a full-scale nuclear war, there would have 
been little left in the hitherto "civilized" world worth occupying. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Soviet nuclear doctrine evolved in historical and ideological circumstances 
distinct from those of the United States. During the initial period of inferiority, the 
doctrine downplayed the importance of the new weapon and emphasized Soviet 
conventional might and the inevitable progression of history. During the period when the 
Soviets were developing a credible arsenal, Khrushchev tried to use threats and bombast 
to make the Soviets equal to the West. The dangerous consequences of this resulted in 
his downfall and the redoubling of efforts to build up the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The 
USSR did reach a rough parity with the United States under Brezhnev. This provided a 
basis for Soviet political strategy until Gorbachev adopted a new approach to relations 
with the West. 
In its ultimate form, Soviet nuclear doctrine was in fact a warfighting strategy. 
Deterrence was seen as desirable, but the Soviets refused to be governed by the concept 
of MAD. According to Soviet doctrine, a realistic plan for conducting nuclear war would 
provide the most effective basis for deterrence. This strategy flowed from Clausewitz's 
dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Soviet doctrine held that a 
56 Ibid., 82. 
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nuclear war must serve some strategic purpose. To achieve the ultimate victory of 
socialism over imperialism, the Soviet Union formulated various plans for waging war at 
different levels of violence. All of these operations had the goal ofbringing about the 
decisive military and political defeat of the West. 
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III: RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM AND DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union and its hulking military machine, Russian 
military planners have sought to redefine Russia's military posture to reflect its new 
security environment. Military reform naturally plays an important role in this process. 
The debacle in Chechnya in 1994-1996 made it apparent that the post-Soviet Russian 
army was not up to the challenge of defending the country's territorial integrity against 
poorly equipped domestic uprisings, much less against any substantial foreign threat. 
Reform has moved in the direction of a smaller and more professional force. This would 
represent a major cultural shift away from the traditional Russian practice of relying on a 
massive conventional army composed largely of conscripts to defend the country's 
borders and interests. In addition Russia in 1993 adopted a new military doctrine that 
puts more emphasis on nuclear weapons in light of Russia's conventional military 
deficiencies. 
The consequences of such a change in posture are best examined from two 
standpoints: the feasibility for Russia itself to successfully adopt such a strategy and the 
exact nature ofRussia's nuclear doctrine. The question of modernizing and 
professionalizing Russia's military is a problematic one, given the current internal state 
of affairs both economically and politically. Naturally, the importance of nuclear 
weapons is greatly accentuated under such conditions. This chapter examines the 
collapse of Russia's conventional military capability and the reform process that is 
intended to reverse this trend. The chapter also investigates the process of military 
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doctrinal reform in Russia and the new postures for both strategic and non-strategic (or 
tactical) nuclear weapons that have resulted from the process. 
B. THE COLLAPSE OF RUSSIAN CONVENTIONAL MILTIARY 
CAPABILITY 
The end of the Soviet state had dire consequences for the Red Army. The force 
that had once been the dread of Europe was reduced in less than five years to a force that 
could not even defeat a loosely organized group of Chechen rebels. The defeat in the 
First Chechen War (1994-1996) was the most tangible demonstration of the ineptitude of 
Russian conventional forces, but a closer look at a number of quantitative and qualitative 
factors is even more sobering. Efforts at reform have largely failed due to a lack of 
financial resources and to political infighting within the military establishment. Given 
that Russia appears bent on continuing to behave as if it was a great power, and that its 
own leaders acknowledge that nuclear weapons must now substitute for conventional 
forces, 57 it is possible to imagine various scenarios in the Caucasus and elsewhere in 
which Russian generals, bogged down and desperate, might turn to the nuclear option. 
By any number of quantitative measures, the picture for the Russian military is 
bad and growing worse. In a comparison of the Russian armed forces in 1996 with the 
Soviet military of 1986, active duty manpower had decreased by more than 70 percent. 58 
The huge 3:1 Soviet advantage over the United States in armored fighting vehicles in 
1986 had become a U.S. advantage. 59 Numbers of combat aircraft and artillery pieces 
have decreased by more than one third in the same time period. 60 Badly outclassed by 
57 Russian Duma member Alexei Arbatov, quoted in Stuart D. Goldman, Russian Conventional Armed 
Forces: On the Verge of Collapse? Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1997, 2. 




the U.S. Navy even at the height of its power, today's Russian Navy has no conventional 
combatants that can hope to match the firepower of a U.S. Navy carrier battle group. 61 
The numbers for the future look even worse, because funds for new weapons 
procurement are virtually nonexistent. This could lead to a crisis of bloc obsolescence 
within the next ten years. Most of the existing weapons systems were designed in the late 
1970s or early 1980s and are fast approaching the end of their useful service lives. 62 
If one looks at qualitative indicators of Russian military readiness, the picture is 
equally bad. In 1997, some experts put the number of combat-ready ground divisions at 
somewhere between zero and eight. Perhaps only 20 percent of tanks and fewer than half 
of combat aircraft can be considered operational. 63 As far as training is concerned, there 
have been no divisional-level exercises since 1992, and combat pilots on average fly 30 
hours per year, or less than one-tenth as many as their U.S. counterparts.64 Morale is 
abysmal, with rampant hazing among conscripts and enlisted men and a terrible retention 
problem for officers. 65 
C. RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM 
The process of military reform in Russia has been a halting one for the last ten 
years. The final years ofGorbachev's reign saw shrinking defense budgets, along with 
disengagement from the Soviets' traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In 
1990, the Soviets disavowed the use of warfare for political gains, claimed that no state 
was inherently their enemy, and sought to preserve military parity as a cornerstone of 
61 lbid. 
62 lbid., 9. 
63 lbid., 19. 
64 Ibid., 20. 
65 Ibid. 
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stability.66 After the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991, Defense Minister 
Pavel Grachev sought to dismantle much of the old apparatus and create a Mobile Force 
to better deal with regional contingencies on the periphery of Russia. During the period 
1993-1995, Grachev proposed that the size of the military be cut, and that up to half of 
the NCOs and enlisted personnel become "contract" volunteers. 67 Opposition from the 
General Staff doomed these plans, and an attempt was made to preserve as much ofthe 
old apparatus as possible. The disastrous war in Chechnya in 1994-1996 brought the 
military to the brink of complete collapse, confirming that reforms were necessary. As 
this defeat suggested, and by almost any objective quantitative or qualitative measure, 
Russia's conventional fighting capability had sunk to a dangerously low level. By 1996, a 
presidential election season was in full swing, and any attempts to reform the military 
became highly politicized. Grachev was a casualty of this process. 68 After the election, 
there were still calls for an all-volunteer force, but the lack of a professional NCO corps 
exacerbated the obstacles to making the military a professional force. Problems with pay 
to officers have also fed discontent in the armed forces and provided a weapon to 
opponents of reform. 
By 1997, the reform debate went public between Grachev's replacement as 
Defense Minister, Igor Rodionov, and Yuri Baturin, the Defense Council Secretary, with 
the latter hoping for a quick transition to a force modeled on the U.S. military.69 At the 
same time, increased tensions with the West were becoming apparent, especially with 
66 Pavel Felgenhauer, Russian Military Reform: Ten Years of Failure, presented at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 26-27 March 1997,3. 
67 Ibid., 5. . 
68 Ibid., 13. 
69 Ibid., 31. 
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regard to.NATO expansion. This has come to be a unifying factor among Russia's 
disparate foreign policy factions. 
Alexei Arbatov, the deputy chairman of the Committee on Defense of the Duma, 
has identified several areas where there is a general consensus among the positions 
advocated by the various proponents of military reform. First, Russia must maintain 
defensive capabilities that will effectively address real threats while not overburdening 
the economy. Second, the traditional Russian emphasis on quantity of forces must be 
changed to an emphasis on quality. Third, recent tensions with NATO notwithstanding, 
Russia must reorient its contingency planning away from Western European and global 
theaters and instead plan for actions on Russia's southern rim. Finally, Russia's nuclear 
deterrent is an indispensable guarantor of security against major threats until this reform 
process can be completed. 70 
Officially, the Russian Defense Ministry has not determined exact details of the 
ultimate reorganization of the Russian armed forces. Arbatov envisions a scenario in 
which the armed forces would be comprised of l,OoO·to 1,500 combat and transport 
aircraft, 15 to 17 heavy army divisions and 2 to 3 light divisions. The navy's main 
missions would be to protect Russian SSBNs and guard exclusive commercial zones. 
Naval forces under this scenario would consist of 70 to 80 large surface combatants, 40 to 
50 attack submarines, and 200 to 300 shore-based naval aircraft. It is also assumed that 
START III will be concluded with the United States, and that this treaty will reduce 
70 Alexei Arbatov, "Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles and Prospects," International 
Security, Vol. 22, No.4 (Spring 1998), 86-87. 
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strategic arms to a level of 1,300 to 1,500 warheads. Total manpower levels will be 
reduced from the present 1.2 million to 800,000 to 900,000 by about 2005.71 
There are still many obstacles to successfully implementing these reforms. The 
largest of these is financial. Paradoxically, it is more expensive to reduce manpower 
levels initially than to maintain them. This is because officers are entitled to severance 
pay, housing, and relocation allowances as they are retired.72 This has two effects. On 
one hand, the cost involved with reducing manpower levels provides political 
ammunition to those opposed to doing so. On the other hand, if these reductions are 
undertaken, they will account for a large portion of the defense budget and squeeze out 
spending that is vitally needed for procurement of new weapons to equip the downsized 
force. Another major obstacle is the continued infighting among members of the defense 
establishment. For example, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev' s plans for an integrated 
command of the nuclear forces are being vehemently resisted by Chief of the General 
Staff Anatoli Kvashnin.73 According to Russian defense journalist Pavel Felgenhauer, as 
a result, "Kvashnin is running the Russian Army into the ground."74 
The final major obstacle to successful reform of the Russian military is the lack of 
a consensus on the strategic direction of Russian foreign policy. The military cannot be 
an effective tool of this policy until the policy itself is elucidated. Will Russia continue 
to harbor great power ambitions and attempt to influence events in Europe? Or will 
Russia begin to look inward and seek to solve its own problems while pursuing a 
71 Ibid., 121-123. 
72 Ibid., 119. 
73 Ian Traynor "Bogged Down in Chechnya, Russia Returns to Cold War Rhetoric and the Nuclear Option," 
The Guardian, London, 14 January 2000. FBIS transcribed text. 
74 Felgenhauer, quoted in ibid. 
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cooperative foreign policy that focuses mainly on local threats? The answers to these 
questions will in time be provided by the actions of the new Putin government. 
D. RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE 
Now that the reform process has evolved to its present state, what are the 
prospects for reform to a new military posture in Russia? This must be looked at from 
two angles. First, what is the probability of Russia being able to create a credible 
conventional force able to respond effectively to the regional security problems that 
Russia is faced with? Secondly, would this force, even successfully created, be able to 
serve with nuclear weapons as an effective and credible deterrent? On the first question, 
the jury is still out. Many U.S. and Russian analysts foresee a long-term crisis of Russian 
conventional capabilities, especially if Russia is determined to reassert its status as a great 
power. The latest version of the Russian Federation military doctrine was announced in 
April 2000, and it throws some light on Russian aspirations. 
The military doctrine of April 2000 is the product of a long evolutionary process 
in Russian military thought dating back to the aftermath of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. 
During the Soviet period military doctrine was beholden to the larger ideological doctrine 
of the Soviet state. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian military leaders set out to 
define what their new doctrine would be. In November 1993 a new doctrine was 
approved. It must be remembered that this was also the time of a post-Cold War 
"honeymoon" when both Russia and the United States spoke hopefully of a new 
partnership and before any of the recent Russia-NATO tensions became apparent. 
The new military doctrine outlines the world military and political situation 
through Russian eyes. The document offers a less positive perspective on relations with 
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the West than the 1993 doctrine. The first draft of this document, released in October 
1999, viewed the current situation as being defined as a conflict between "a unipolar 
world based on one superpower and on the use of military force to resolve key problems 
ofworld policy, and ... a multipolar world based on the equal rights of peoples and 
nations ... "75 The unnamed unipolar power is the United States. The October 1999 draft 
further stated that "The Russian Federation proceeds from the assumption that social 
progress, stability, and international security can be enslired only within the framework of 
a multipolar world."76 This worldview is completely consistent with Russian opposition 
to NATO enlargement, to NATO actions in the former Yugoslavia, to Anglo-American 
military actions against Iraq, and frankly to any other major action by the United States 
and its allies that excludes Russia as an active participant. This language was, however, 
deleted from the official version adopted in April 2000.77 
The deletion of this language may be largely a political gesture to signal that 
Putin's government is interested in pursuing a more business-like relationship with the 
West than its predecessors. The updated version of the doctrine does still identify a 
major threat as ''the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detrimen~ofthe 
Russian Federation's military security."78 This is obviously a reference to NATO 
enlargement. Another factor, in line with Russia's criticism ofNATO and U.S. military 
actions (notably the NATO intervention in Kosovo in March-June 1999) is the 
"utilization of military-force actions as a means of 'humanitarian intervention' without 
75 Russian Federation Draft Military Doctrine, Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, 9 October 1999, Paragraph 1.1. 
FBIS translated text. 
761bid. 
77 Russian Federation Military Doctrine, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, 22 April2000. FBIS translated 
text. 
78 Ibid., Section I, Paragraph 5 
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the sanction of the UN Security Council, in circumvention of the generally accepted 
principles and norms ofintemationallaw."79 
Russian thought has stayed in line with Soviet thinking, especially when 
considering the importance of the "initial period of war". In Soviet doctrine the initial 
period of war was the decisive period when the character and outcome of the whole war 
could be determined. This was true both for offensive and defensive operations. The 
great example from Soviet history for this was Hitler's invasion in 1941. · Because the 
Germans failed to achieve their strategic goals in the initial period, and because Soviet 
forces were able to deny them that success, the outcome of the war was determined. 80 
Therefore the way in which a state moves into this initial period is very important. In the 
new Russian military doctrine, the initial period is again emphasized, with such actions as 
a timely declaration of war, coordination of various types of warfare efforts, placing the 
economy on a war footing, and coordination of mobilization all given high priority.81 
With the increased range and lethality of modem weapons (especially nuclear), the initial 
period can now be seen as even more decisive. 82 
E. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 
Nuclear employment policy under the new doctrine continues in the same spirit as 
the 1993 doctrine, which gave up the explicit no-first-use pledge that was Soviet policy 
since 1982. While it possessed massive conventional forces, the Soviet Union was able 
to depend on a "second-strike" nuclear posture. 83 This required the possession of a 
survivable deterrent that would be able to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage on any 
79 Ibid., Paragraph 3 · 
80 This view is expounded at length in Ivanov, S.P., The Initial Period of War, 1986. 
81 Russian Military Doctrine, 2000, Section I, Paragraph 10. 
82 Gareev, General Makhmut, If War Comes Tomorrow? (London: Frank Cass, 1998}, 110. 
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aggressor. Given the collapse of Russian conventional force capabilities, the 
conventional force posture may no longer be able to deter a conventional attack. The 
wording of the nuclear weapons use policy in the new doctrine is as follows: 
The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons 
in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass 
destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-
scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the 
national security of the Russian Federation. 
The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against states 
party to the Nonproliferation Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons 
except in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, the Russian 
Federation Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or a state to which it 
has security commitments that is carried out or supported by a state 
without nuclear weapons jointly or in the context of allied commitments 
with a state with nuclear weapons. 84 
The last statement is a reflection of the negative security assurances Russia offered in 
conjunction with the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review and extension 
conference. 
What then are the reasons behind such a change in policy? Nuclear weapons are 
seen as the ultimate deterrent to great power war. As long as Russia is in possession of 
these weapons, no adversary will be able to contemplate a major attack against Russian 
soil. 85 Since nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent against aggression or coercion, they 
are a useful hedge against uncertainty for Russian planners. 86 As Defense Minister 
Sergeyev stated in October 1998, 
In case of direct threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
state owing to an external aggression against Russia, [it would be] 
83 Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons," The Washington Quarterly, summer 1997, 1. 
84 Russian Military Doctrine, 2000, Section I, Paragraph 8. 
85 Sokov, 1997, 2. 
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possible and legitimate to use all available means, up to and including 
nuclear weapons, to counter this threat. 87 
The old second-strike logic of possessing the ability to inflict a retaliatory strike 
of unacceptable damage on a would-be aggressor remains. Calculations for what exactly 
constitutes this deterrence capability are complex, as are the formulae that determine the 
proper force constitution to ensure a retaliatory capability. As Nikolai Sokov, a Russian 
analyst, explains, the main point is to make the other side believe that Russia has this 
ability, because if that belief is not maintained and a nuclear strike is launched, deterrence 
has failed. 88 
These changes in Russia's strategic nuclear posture are understandable in light of 
the deficiencies in its conventional forces. The nuclear posture of the United States and 
NATO has long followed the principle of "flexible response," in that no guarantee against 
first use has been given. This was partly intended to compensate for the overwhelming 
numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Today the situation is 
reversed, and it is Russia that is conventionally weak. 
The published military doctrine is primarily a political statement that does not 
necessarily capture the dynamics of Russian military thought about nuclear deterrence. 
According to Nikolai Sokov, the debate in Russia is now between the liberal-minded 
"minimalist" view of deterrence and the hawkish "maximalist" view. 89 The "minimalist" 
camp sees nuclear weapons as an insurance policy that should be maintained at a 
87 Sergeyev quoted in Walter Parchomenko, "The State of Russia's Armed Forces and Military Reform," 
Parameters, Winter 1999-2000. 
88 Sokov, 1997, 3. 
89 Nikolai Sokov, Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia: The Emerging New Posture, 
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relatively low cost because the future threat may not materialize. For example, according 
to Sergei Kortunov, a Russian commentator, 
The optimal version of Russia's nuclear strategy today is a variant 
of non-aggressive, non-offensive and non-provocative (one could even say 
"friendly"), but also credible deterrence, which should be aimed not only 
at the United· States, but "at all azimuths" - a Russian version of ... de 
Gaulle's doctrine of"dissuasion" as opposed to the American doctrine of 
"deterrence" through the threat of annihilation.90 
Unfortunately, many in the Russian military establishment champion the 
"maximalist" view of nuclear deterrence.91 Although freed from the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology of the Soviet era, these thinkers still believe that a credible warfighting doctrine 
and posture constitute the best deterrent. Those in the "maximalist" camp call for an 
expansion of the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence, strategic force modernization and 
an expanded role for non-strategic or tactical nuclear forces. 92 Statements by people in 
this camp are the greatest cause for alarm, because they speak openly of a lower threshold 
for nuclear weapons use. 
1. Strategic Nuclear Weapons 
Since strategic nuclear weapons now constitute one of Moscow's major 
remaining reasons to be considered relevant in international affairs, Russia is adamant 
about preserving the deterrent capability at all costs. Recent Russian reactions to the 
possibility of the U.S. deployment of National Missile Defense (NMD) attest to this. 
Measures such as the adoption of a preemptive strike doctrine and outfitting the new SS-
27 ICBM with multiple warheads have been openly considered in the face of such a U.S. 
90 Sergei Kortunov quoted in ibid., 6. 
91 Peter Pry, War Scare (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1999), 263-272. 
92 Sokov, 1998,8. 
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capability.93 This is not to suggest that the United States would ever seriously consider 
launching an aggressive or unprovoked nuclear attack on Russia. The main Russian fear 
is that the loss of a viable retaliatory capability could leave Russia vulnerable to precision 
conventional attacks such as those the United States has conducted in Iraq and Serbia.94 
An attack on national assets that are viewed as vital, such as early warning radars and 
command and control installations, could also be seen as an attack on Russia's retaliatory 
capability and require a nuclear response.95 
Russia faces serious questions about where to proceed with its strategic arsenal in 
light of its obligations under START II and its desire to seek further bilateral reductions 
under START III. The Russian military realizes that because of economic constraints it 
will be hard-pressed to maintain its arsenal even at START II levels.96 Regardless of 
what transpires in arms control negotiations, Russia faces the bloc obsolescence of its 
strategic arsenal in the 2005-2010 period. It is currently proceeding with the deployment 
of the SS-27 ICBM, but the rest of the triad is becoming obsolete. Given the economic 
constraints that it faces, Russia may be forced to give up most of its sea- and air-launched 
nuclear weapons and base its deterrent entirely on land-based ICBMs. If this scenario 
comes to fruition, it will be more difficult for Russia to maintain START II force levels.97 
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2. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 
During the Cold War, the Soviets built up a stockpile of well over 10,000 tactical 
nuclear weapons.98 By the middle of the 1980s, the Soviet tactical nuclear arsenal was 
estimated to be at least the equal of its NATO counterpart. Although the Soviets had 
announced an official position of no-first-use in 1982, they were quite prepared for a 
limited nuclear war, although this was not openly acknowledged.99 In 1991, U.S. 
President George Bush announced the unilateral removal from operational status and 
dismantling of most U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. 100 An understanding was reached 
with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and with his successor, Russian President Boris 
Y eltsin, that Russia would follow suit. However, it appears that Russia to date has done 
less than it promised to do in this area. 101 
Russia is probably continuing to keep these weapons operational because it 
believes that it may have cause to use them - for deterrence purposes, if not in combat. 
Recent statements indicate that the threshold for using non-strategic nuclear weapons has 
been lowered. Russian military officials and analysts talk of using nuclear arms 
· preemptively against potential conventional attacks. Such strikes might have the purpose 
of controlling escalation of a conflict.102 A recent article in the Russian military 
newspaper Voyennaya Mysl argued for nuclear weapons use to de-escalate military 
operations: 
Fulfilling the de-escalation function is understood to mean actually 
using nuclear weapons both for showing resolve as well as for the 
98 David S. Yost, The US and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe, Adelphi Paper 326, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1999, 50. 
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immediate delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy. It is advisable to 
execute this mission using non-strategic (above all operational-tactical) 
nuclear weapons, which can preclude an "avalanching" escalation of the 
use of nuclear weapons right up to an exchange of massed nuclear strikes 
delivered by strategic assets. It seems that the cessation of military 
operations will be the most acceptable thing for the enemy in this case. 103 
Non-strategic nuclear weapons are also seen as a means to achieve or restore a 
favorable balance of forces on the battlefield. Statements to this effect acknowledge the 
weakness of the Russian military's conventional forces. One Russian commentator has 
stated that "Russia would make a first strike not to achieve decisive victory, but to 
impose its will on the adversary, and for practical purposes, to restore the status quo on 
the battlefield." 104 Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer has stated that, due to Russia's 
conventional military weakness, 
This means that in any confrontation with the expanding West 
(say, a conflict over Russian military transit in and out of the Kaliningrad 
enclave), Russian generals will feel compelled to prevent the massing of 
superior enemy forces not with a preemptive conventional offensive, but 
with a first and early local nuclear strike. 105 
One new doctrinal proposal in Russia calls for a policy in which the employment 
of tactical nuclear forces would be controlled at several different levels of escalation, 
always being careful not to cross the "activation threshold" for strategic nuclear forces. 106 
Several conditions are identified as justifications for crossing the nuclear threshold: 
The conditions for using non-strategic nuclear weapons can be as 
follows: enemy use of mass destruction weapons or reliable discovery of 
his preparation for their use; destruction of our strategic weapons, above 
103 Major-General V.I. Levshin, Colonel A. V. Nedelin, and Colonel M. Ye. Sosnovskiy, "Use of Nuclear 
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all nuclear weapons, and also important economic installations (atomic 
electric power stations, hydroelectric stations, major enterprises of the 
chemical and military industry, the most important transportation hubs) by 
enemy conventional weapons; appearance of a threat of disturbance of 
stability of a strategic defense in the presence of a large-scale enemy 
invasion.107 
Strikes by non-strategic nuclear forces would then be made at five different levels of 
escalation, ranging from demonstrations of will all the way up to full-scale strategic 
nuclear war. 108 It is candidly admitted that if the final scale of escalation were reached, 
the deterrence and de-escalation missions would have failed. 
These discussions about the possible operational uses of non-strategic weapons 
exemplify Sokov's "maximalist" camp. This school of thought regards nuclear weapons 
as useful for expanded deterrence in contingencies down to the level of regional war. As 
three Russian colonels recently stated in Voyennaya Mysl: 
In our view, strategic stability can be ensured at a global level 
chiefly by strategic nuclear forces and at a regional/eve/ by non-strategic 
nuclear forces equipped with operational-tactical nuclear weapons, 
together with general-purpose forces and, if necessary, with the air 
component of the strategic nuclear forces. 109 
The fact that many in the Russian military and media have begun to talk more 
openly about tactical nuclear use indicates that the traditional taboo against the 
operational employment of such weapons, to the extent it exerted some influence in 
Russia, has begun to weaken. After observing the effects of the modem long-range 
precision-guided munitions employed by the United States in Iraq and Kosovo, many 
Russians contend that the distinction between these weapons and low-yield nuclear 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Colonel V. A. Ivasik, Colonel A. S. Pisyaukov, and Colonel A. L. Khryapin, "Discussion Forum: 
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weapons has been blurred. They see the disarming effects of these weapons on critical 
command and communications nodes as analogous to the damage that could be caused by 
limited nuclear strikes. 110 
There have also been discussions in Russia regarding the creation of nuclear 
forces that would be more operationally useful in non-strategic missions. During an 
April1999 meeting of the Russian Federation Security Council, it has been reported, the 
Ministry of Atomic Energy was directed to draw up plans to build up to 10,000 of a new 
generation of low-yield nuclear weapons. These weapons would ostensibly enable 
Russia to project power with limited strikes in much the same way that United States is 
able to use its precision conventional munitions.111 The proposal, originally championed 
by Viktor Mikhailov, then the Minister of Atomic Energy, called for a generation of 
nuclear weapons that would explode with yields between .05 and .1 0 kilotons.112 Also, 
the warheads on strategic nuclear missiles reportedly will be modified so that they will 
have a similar low-yield option that could be changed back to the normal yield if 
necessary. Mikhailov reportedly believes that the cre·ation of such weapons would make 
the use of nuclear pressure more effective, since these weapons would not cause mass 
collateral damage and could therefore be used with less compunction.113 It should be 
noted that this story was released during NATO's air campaign over Kosovo and may 
have been released as a political gesture rather than because of its existence as a real 
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option. Such a program would be expensive and (if actually pursued and made public) 
might be damaging to Russia's international standing. 
There has also been a call for the redevelopment of Russian IR.BM capabilities by 
Sergei Brezkun, a senior Russian nuclear scientist. Such a capability is seen as an option 
to give Russia a better regional nuclear deterrent against hostile NATO actions. The 
proposal equates non-strategic nuclear forces with NATO's long-range PGM capabilities. 
According to Brezkun, 
It can be asserted with a high degree of confidence that the 
appearance of new reproduced Pioneer (SS-20) IRBMs (or other IRBMs) 
in the Russian Federation armed forces can lead to a radical change in the 
psychology of the leadership ofNATO countries with respect to ideas of 
bloc enlargement and so on.114 
As with the reported proposal for very low yield nuclear weapons, this proposal would 
face obvious economic and diplomatic obstacles (including the abandonment of the INF 
Treaty) if it were seriously plirsued. 
What are the chances of these new doctrines actually being put to use in 
operational contingencies? If one takes seriously Russian statements and the new 
military doctrine, some troubling trends emerge. Proponents of the operational use of 
tactical nuclear weapons emphasize the objective of escalation control. At the same time, 
the military doctrine names escalation and expansion of warfare as basic features of 
modem war.115 This view is shared by prominent Russian military thinkers.116 Also, the 
importance ofbeing dominant in the initial period of war is emphasized. Russia's 
dependence on nuclear weapons to achieve erstwhile conventional tasks should be 
113lbid. 
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recalled, as well as the fact that achievement of this dominance in the initial period of war 
is likely to escalate a conflict to the nuclear level quickly. In other words, the two 
purposes stated for the early employment of tactical nuclear weapons (escalation control 
and initial period dominance) are dangerously contradictory. 
Where are the flashpoints where these contradictions may constitute more than an 
academic exercise? The issue ofNATO expansion usually prompts particularly harsh 
Russian rhetoric. Some Russians have argued that Moscow should station nuclear 
weapons in the Kaliningrad Oblast to counter NATO expansion into Poland. 117 Some 
Russian commentators have also claimed that, due to NATO expansion, any future 
European war would go nuclear "in a matter ofhours."118 Other Russian observers have 
suggested that Russia will stop dismantling its tactical nuclear weapons in response to 
NATO developing closer ties with the Baltic States.119 These dire predictions have 
become somewhat commonplace in Russian commentary on NATO, particularly in light 
ofthe prospects for continued eastward expansion and NATO actions against Serbia. 
However, a realistic look at the situation in Europe shows that a military confrontation 
between Russia and NATO is unlikely in the foreseeable future, given Russia's continued 
internal trouble~. However, it would be imprudent to exclude the possibility of such a 
confrontation, because a Russian government burdened with internal problems might in a 
mood of desperation seek national unity and cohesion by initiating an international crisis. 
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The picture in the Caucasus is not so rosy. In September 1999, Russia launched 
the Second Chechen War. Some commentators in Russia have called for the use of 
nuclear weapons in Chechnya, although nothing this drastic has been officially 
threatened. 120 This could change if Russia again faced military defeat as in 1996. Some 
Russian generals have said that they will not obey any orders from Moscow that stop 
short of achieving absolute victory.121 If faced with imminent defeat, Vladimir Putin, 
who has staked his credibility on handling the Chechen problem, might turn to desperate 
measures to salvage victory. Aside from Chechnya, there are simmering tensions in the 
Russian Federation in the regions of North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Dagestan. In the 
Caucasian "Near Abroad," Russia has been trying to perpetuate its hegemony, and has 
had its hands in the Armenian-Azeri Nagomo-Karabakh war, and in the Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian separatist movements in Georgia. Currently, neither Turkey nor Iran has 
the wherewithal to challenge Russian influence in the region. IfRussia continues to 
weaken, they may see an opening, given their perception of Russian weakness. Russia 
might then be driven to move in to reassert itself, and this could lead to a military 
confrontation that might in some circumstances involve nuclear threats or even actual 
operational employment of nuclear weapons. 
Could Russia's leaders ever actually seriously contemplate the use of nuclear 
weapons in a contingency in which Russia's very existence was not at risk? Recent 
statements by Russian officials appear to be intended to reassure the world that Russia is 
not about to recklessly employ nuclear weapons. In December 1999 First Deputy Chief of 
12° Filipov, David, "Russia Pounds Chechnya Capital," The Boston Globe, 25 September 1999, Al. 
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the General Staff General Valeri Manilov declared that "Nuclear arms can only be used if 
an armed aggression is launched against Russia ... If there is no aggression, nuclear arms 
won't be used."122 In February 2000 Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated that "Russia is 
not threatening anyone and does not intend to use its nuclear forces to bring pressure."123 
Alexei Arbatov acknowledged in 1997.that Russia's use of nuclear weapons in 
any contingency would be "suicidal" because ofNATO's overwhelming conventional 
and nuclear superiority. He expressed the fear that members of the General Staff do not 
think "in such rational terms."124 The fact that such matters are openly discussed in 
Russian military circles is cause for alarm. If nuclear weapons use is thought to be a real 
option in peacetime discussions, the chance is greater that this will be seen as a viable 
option in crisis conditions. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Russia faces a widening gap between its ambitions and its capabilities. Its 
conventional military forces are in disarray, with little prospect of imminent 
improvement. Attempts at military reform have met with little success due to political 
disagreements and Russia's continuing economic crisis. At the same time, many 
Russians still consider their country to be a great power. The only way to preserve this 
status in military terms is to rely on the nuclear arsenal that Russia inherited from the 
Soviet Union. Because ofRussia's conventional military weakness, the role of nuclear 
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forces has been expanded to include contingencies that would have been handled with 
conventional military power in the past. 
Russia's doctrinal declarations about its lowered nuclear threshold are not in 
themselves especially alarming. Today, Russia is faced with a military situation similar 
to that which prompted NATO to adopt its flexible response doctrine. Russia cannot 
hope to challenge NATO in conventional military terms and judges that it must therefore 
depend on its first-use nuclear weapons policy to deter conventional attacks. The 
discussions among Russian military officers and commentators about the drastically 
lowered nuclear threshold are the real cause for alarm. These officers were trained under 
Soviet doctrine that called for the efficacious use of nuclear weapons at various stages of 
warfare. Although current Russian thought is not beholden to the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology of Soviet times, the belief in the practicality of waging a nuclear war appears to 
have survived, at least in key military circles. 
Russia remains politically unstable. Vladimir Putin, although popularly elected, 
still remains a mystery. The chances of Russia seeking a military confrontation are low. 
However, Putin faces situations in the Caucasus, including Chechnya, that are still 
unsettled. If Russia became involved militarily in a large-scale Caucasian conflict, and 
that effort became a quagmire, Putin might feel compelled politically to take drastic 
measures in order to reverse the situation. In such a contingency, some of his advisors 
might argue that the use of nuclear weapons would be a realistic option. How such 
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circumstances could arise in the turbulent Caucasus region is considered in the next 
chapter. 
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IV: POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC DYNAMICS INVOLVING 
RUSSIA IN THE CAUCASUS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caucasus region has been an area of 
continual strife and discord. The sudden disappearance of authority from Moscow, when 
added to the mix of ancient ethnic rivalries and modem geopolitical ambitions, has served 
to fuel conflict in the region. Russia has declared the region to be of vital security 
importance as part of the "Near Abroad" of former Soviet republics. The region also 
figures prominently in the security concerns of both Turkey and Iran. Russia has 
repeatedly tried to assert its influence in the region, in matters both internal and external 
to the Russian Federation. The most glaring examples are the two Chechen wars, the first 
in 1994-96, and the second underway since September 1999. The disastrous end to the 
first war had profound effects on Russian military and political power. The collapse of 
the Russian military's conventional fighting capability has led to an increased reliance on 
nuclear arms, and it is not inconceivable that these could be employed in the region. 
Given both this fact and the general instability of the region, the question of Russian 
interventionism has become a troubling one for NATO, partly because of the risk that a 
conflict in the Caucasus could bring Turkey and Russia into conflict. 
This chapter examines the evolution of Russian policies in the Caucasus since the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. Regional and competing external strategic interests are 
examined as potential sources of future conflict. Contingencies that could bring Russia 
into further military operations in the region are also explored. Finally, the chapter 
considers how these future scenarios could involve the use of nuclear weapons. 
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B. THE SOVIET COLLAPSE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
INDEPENDENT STATES 
The Caucasus did not share in the benefits of autonomy under Gorbachev's 
policies of glasnost and perestroika that had come to regions such as the Baltic states and 
Central Asia. Nationalist sentiment was brutally put down in Georgia in April 1989 and 
in Azerbaijan in January 1990. Public attitudes in Armenia were less anti-Moscow, as 
Yerevan hoped to use Moscow's influence to reach a favorable resolution of.the 
ongoing struggle in Nagomo-Karabakh.125 
On 19 August 1991, a group of conservative officials launched a coup against 
Mikhail Gorbachev that had the goal of reversing many of the liberal policies that had, in 
their eyes, brought the Soviet Union to the brink of disintegration. Within four days the 
abortive coup collapsed from lack of popular and military support. This episode sent the 
Soviet Union into its final death throes. The main impetus behind popular resistance to 
the coup was the leader of the Russian Federated Soviet Republic, Boris Yeltsin. In 
many respects, Y eltsin staged the real coup, as he assumed effective control even though 
Gorbachev ~as nominally returned to power. 126 In order to complete the change, Yeltsin 
proposed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It appears that during these hasty 
maneuvers little serious planning was done to decide what exactly would replace the 
Soviet power structures. 
In place of the Soviet structure, Y eltsin proposed the creation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The exact nature of this new organization 
was unclear from the beginning, as only a loose framework was established. The CIS 
125 William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus (I~dianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1995), 9. 
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originally was to include only the Slavic republics of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. 
Invitations were later extended to the rest of the former Soviet republics, but both 
Georgia and Azerbaijan initially refused to join. Misunderstandings were prevalent from 
the beginning. Conservative officials, especially those in the military, thought that the 
CIS represented a change in name only, rather than a fundamental upheaval of the old 
Soviet structures. 127 Russian policy towards the CIS has fluctuated; it was initially 
ambivalent, and then became more assertive. 
In the Caucasus the CIS became a tool to guarantee Russian influence over the 
region. When a suitable institutional framework failed to take shape, Russia responded 
by using bilateral agreements throughout the CIS to preserve political and economic 
hegemony. Moscow also resorted to more underhanded tactics to facilitate the accession 
of Caucasian states to the CIS. In Georgia, Russia sought to play off separatist elements 
in Abkhazia against the new government. Azerbaijan alarmed Russia by strengthening its 
links to Turkey and by threatening to cut Russia off from deals involving the lucrative 
Azeri oil industry. Moscow supported a coup by a military dissident and the installation 
of a new pro-Russian government in Baku. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan bowed to 
Russian pressure and joined the CIS.128 
The CIS has been hampered from its beginnings by the divergent conceptions of 
its purposes among its members. It did not develop into an all-encompassing Eurasian 
super-state or into a multi-purpose "variable geometry" entity in the spirit of the 
European Union. As was mentioned, the states of the Caucasus joined the organization 
126 Ibid.,IO. 
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because of either a beneficial relationship with Moscow or outright coercion by Russia. 
As for the other states of the former Soviet Union, their participation in the CIS also 
varied. The Baltic states, the most independence-minded and Westward-looking of the 
successor states even under Soviet rule, did not join. Belarus has lacked any historical 
inclination for independence and thus has sought to become as close as possible with 
Russia. For Minsk, the CIS represented an attractive vehicle; under strong Russian 
leadership Belarus could benefit from Russian economic and political patronage. The 
fact that Belarus has continued to follow this course, despite the disastrous state of affairs 
in Russia, speaks volumes about the miserable time that Belarus has had since 1991. 
Similar circumstances have prevailed in much of Central Asia, where independence 
came as an "unsolicited gift"129 to several states in the region. These states all had 
sizeable Russian minority populations and lacked independent national military and 
economic institutions. Like Belarus, they had much to gain from Russian patronage. 
The largest and most important of the non-Russian successor states is Ukraine. Its 
support for the CIS has been qualified at best, because its leaders have always been 
mindful of guarding its newly acquired independence. There are several reasons for this. 
First, and most importantly, Ukraine has the potential to become a more significant 
power, given its huge industrial and agricultural possibilities, with a lan~ass and 
population roughly equivalent in size to those ofFrance.130 Second, despite centuries of 
Russian and then Soviet rule, Ukrainian nationalism has been preserved. While there are 
regional variations in this respect, many Ukrainians are naturally suspicious of any 
129 Mark Webber, The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1996), 96. 
130 Ibid., 110. 
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further Russian meddling in their affairs. Two post-Soviet issues are emblematic of this. 
The first is the issue of the Crimean Peninsula. Geographically within Ukraine, it had 
traditionally been ruled by Russia until it was "given" to the Soviet Ukraine in 1954. The 
peninsula is home to an ethnic Russian majority population, further feeding the rhetoric 
of those in Russia who believe that control should revert back to Moscow from 
Ukraine. 131 The other main issue of contention has been control of the former Soviet 
Black Sea Fleet. The resolution of this issue has involved a long and complex process, 
which did nothing to help relations between the two powers.132 
C. COMPETING STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE CAUCASUS 
1. Armenia 
Armenia is a Christian nation that has struggled for survival among Muslim 
neighbors since it was conquered by the Turks in 1453.133 Since at least the seventeenth 
century, it has sought outside help in winning and guaranteeing its independence. This 
desire, combined with Russian imperial ambitions and antagonism towards the Ottoman 
Empire, brought it under Russian influence. As political controls were eased during 
Gorbachev's reforms, Armenia raised the issue ofNagomo-Karabakh, a province largely 
populated by ethnic Armenians but under the political control of Azerbaijan. Armenia 
and Azerbaijan soon became involved in active conflict. This struggle provided an 
impetus for Armenian nationalism and independence, but it also had detrimental effects. 
It has complicated economic development in a nation lacking commercially attractive 
energy resources like Azerbaijan and has made Armenia beholden to Russia for its 
131 Ibid., 103. 
132 James Sherr, "Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords," Survival, vol. 39, no.3, 
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wellbeing. As a consequence, Moscow has been able to use its support as leverage in 
ensuring Annenian compliance with its wishes. Armenia has achieved its main strategic 
goal of survival, but has done so at the cost of giving up much of its autonomy and hopes 
for economic development. 
2. Azerbaijan 
The development of Azeri strategic interests since 1991 has also been strongly 
influenced by external pressure from Russia. The Azeri Popular Front was formed as a 
nationalist faction in May 1989, and subsequently used the conflict in Armenia to its 
·advantage in inflaming nationalist sentiment.134 In January 1990, Soviet troops were sent 
into Baku to restore order. The situation was stabilized until after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, when Popular Front forces, spurred on by the military's poor performance 
against Armenia, forced the parliament to dissolve. A Popular Front government under 
Elchibey came to power, promising to reverse the military situation. Elchibey moved to 
exploit Azerbaijan's oil reserves through deals with Western corporations and improved 
relations with Turkey, two moves that did not sit well in Moscow. As the military 
situation worsened in 1993, Elchibey became convinced that he was about to become the 
victim of a Russian-backed coup and struck a deal with the pro-Russian politician Gaidar 
Aliyev. After assuming power, Aliyev quickly reversed Elchibey's Westward-looking 
policies and moved closer to Moscow, acceding to Russia's demands that Azerbaijan join 
the CIS. 135 However, in December 1999, Azerbaijan announced that it would apply for 
134 Ibid., 79. 
135 Ibid., 81. This episode certainly seems to confirm that Russia was again using underhanded means to 
further its interests in the region. 
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the status of"aspirant to membership" in NATO, signaling a shift in Azeri foreign policy 
away from Russia.136 
Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan is blessed by the presence of natural resources that 
give it a lucrative basis for economic development - substantial oil reserves in the 
Caspian Sea Basin. Elchibey initially began to look westward for ways to exploit these 
reserves, and this policy was only briefly interrupted when Aliyev took power. The main 
problem now is deciding over whose territory the oil pipeline will flow. Russia naturally 
favors a line that would flow over its territory with the Black Sea as the ultimate 
destination. Turkey is in favor of constructing a new line across the mountains, through 
Turkey to the Mediterranean. Because this is a major economic issue that involves states 
in addition to those in the region, the question of oil pipeline routes is a prominent 
possible source of future conflict in the region.137 
3. Georgia 
Even before the end of the Soviet Union, Georgia was becoming a hotbed of 
conflict in the Caucasus. Soviet troops brutally put down demonstrations in Tbilisi in 
April1989, and this served to inflame nationalist sentiment and harden attitudes against 
Moscow. After the nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia took over in October 1990, these 
passions were further inflamed. Fervent Georgian nationalism alarmed non-Georgian . 
minority populations, and separatist movements sprung up in Abkhazia and in South 
Ossetia. Gamsakhurdia also angered Moscow by refusing to cooperate as a member of 
the new CIS. The rebellions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia became vehicles for Russian 
136 
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meddling in Georgian affairs. 138 Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze 
took power in 1992 with the intention of stabilizing the situation, but the chaos worsened. 
Georgian forces suffered defeats in Abkhazia by Russian-backed forces. These defeats 
further destabilized the political situation as various factions began fighting. Russia was 
able to use its leverage over the chaos to force Georgia to accept both Russian military 
bases on its soil and CIS membership. 
In exchange for giving up a measure of autonomy, Georgia has seen a more stable 
situation develop. Russia has put pressure on Abkhazia to come back into the fold. 139 
The Ossetians still remain recalcitrant, however. Politics in Georgia still remains a 
violent business, as suggested by the multiple assassination attempts on Shevardnadze. 
Russian influence still pervades the country, even though Georgia has shown resistance 
to Russia's demands for passage over Georgian soil to fight the war in Chechnya.140 
Georgia's economy has also suffered greatly as a result of the violence, further 
complicating Georgia's efforts to establish its independence from Moscow. 
Shevardnadze has, however, expressed the hope that Georgia will eventually be accepted 
as a member ofNAT0. 141 
4. Turkey 
During the time of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks ruled parts of the Caucasus, 
competing with Russia and Iran. Turkish influence was, however, shut out by the 
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combination of Kamal Ataturk's reforms and the Bolshevik Revolution during World 
War 1.142 Of the three Soviet successor states in the Caucasus, AZerbaijan shares the most 
in common with Turkey. The historical experiences of the two peoples have diverged 
since the formation of the Soviet Union. Anatolian Turkey, which is of Sunni heritage, 
became secular and Westward-oriented. Azeris are of the Shia form of Islam, and their 
culture has been influenced by Iran. 143 Nevertheless, following the Soviet breakup, 
Azerbaijan and Turkey moved closer to one another for a time. Elchibey saw Turkey as a 
good partner and role model and sought closer economic relations. Following Elchibey's 
ouster, Aliyev moved closer to Russia and Iran, to the detriment of Turkish influence.144 
Azerbaijan and Turkey have nonetheless remained in accord on the issue of 
building an oil pipeline leading froin Baku on the Caspian Sea through the mountains to 
Ceyhan on the Anatolian Mediterranean coast. These efforts have been supported by the 
United States and other Western powers. Agreements reached in the spring of 2000 
among Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan have improved the prospects for this pipeline's 
construction.145 This has been a bone of contention with the Russians, who wish to see 
oil from the Caspian cross their territory and be loaded at Novorossiisk on the Black 
Sea.I46 
Turkey's relations with the other two states in the Caucasus have been somewhat 
different. Georgia and Turkey have had generally good relations, because Georgia has 
142 Odom and Dujarric, 1995, 221. 
143 Ibid., 223. 
144 Ibid., 222. 
145 Michael Lelyveld, "Pipeline Project Advances, Hurdles Remain," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2 
May2000. 
146 Gareth Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London: The Royal Institute oflnternational 
Affairs, 1995), 44, and Michael Lelyvekl, "Kremlin Determined to Stay in Race for Caspian Oil," Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 February 2000. 
63 
seen Turkey as an alternative to Russia. However, Russia's campaign to subjugate 
Georgia to its wishes has included efforts to alienate Georgia from Turkey by raising 
fears in Orthodox Christian Georgia of Moslem Turkish influence. So long as Russia 
continues to exert hegemony over Georgia, it is unlikely that Turkey will play much of 
role there. 147 On the other hand, Turkey's relations with Armenia have been 
understandably tense, owing in part to the continued conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan about Nagomo-Karabakh. Moreover, there still exists lingering resentment 
among Armenians about a reported Turkish massacre of Armenians in 1915. Although 
Turkey has not actively supported Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia, Turkey's 
refusal to acknowledge the 1915 incident as a massacre has poisoned relations between 
the two states.148 
Some more extreme forces in Turkey and in the ethnically and culturally Turkic . 
states of the Caucasus and Central Asia have called for the emergence of "Pan-Turkism". 
This concept in extreme form calls for all the peoples ofTurkic origin to be united under 
one government. The Turkish government has distanced itself from such extreme 
rhetoric, as it undoubtedly causes alarm in a great number of capitals.149 Turkey's 
interests in bo~ the Caucasus and Central Asia remain great, however. Aside from the 
issue of the oil pipeline, Turkey is home to a sizeable Chechen population, making 
Turkey sensitive to developments in Chechnya.150 Turkey's greatest interest is in 
regional stability, especially in the Caucasus. Any conflict there is bound to alarm 
Turkey, if only because it might create a refugee problem. As long as the Russians are 
147 Odom and Dujarric, 1995, 221. 
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able to assert their influence and secure some degree of order, Turkey will probably not 
become embroiled in a conflict there. 
5. Iran 
Iran offers an alternative model of Islamic development, a social and political 
model distinct from that of Turkey. Since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Iran has 
been a dynamic nation, seeking to spread its fundamentalist Islamic revolution. This has 
naturally brought it into conflict with all other regimes in the region that wished to 
remain secular or to pursue their own conception of Islam. In pre-Soviet times, the 
Persians were involved in the Caucasus, much like the Ottomans. 151 Following the 
Soviet breakup, Iran sought to improve relations with Shia Azerbaijan, but Tehran's 
efforts to assert real influence were rejected by Elchibey. Aliyev, however, turned away 
from Turkey and improved ties with Iran. Russian hegemony has nonetheless prevented 
Iran from asserting any real influence. Like Turkey, Iran primarily has an interest in 
stability in the region. Any large conflicts are bound to have spillover effects, and Iran's 
governing elite would rather have a stable northern border so that it can deal with the 
internal cracks that are beginning to appear in the revolution.152 
D. THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC DOCTRINE 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been undergoing what can only 
be called a search for its national identity. This is understandable when one considers the 
magnitude of the loss that Russia suffered with the passing of the Soviet empire. If we 
recall that the Soviet Union was primarily a Russian-run affair, the end of the Soviet 
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Union represented a step back of several centuries for Russian territorial conquest. Faced 
with this fact, Russians have had to ask themselves tough questions about how to 
proceed. Is Russia still a great power? Should Russia look to the West for cooperation, 
or for competition? Or do the major threats and opportunities lie to the south and the 
east? How should Russia deal with the former Soviet republics? The final answers that 
Russians provide to these questions will have much to do with determining the ultimate 
fate of the post -Soviet space. This brief survey attempts to encapsulate the evolution of 
Russia's strategic thinking, with a special focus on the Caucasus. 
In the years since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia's foreign policy has 
undergone changes. The first part of the evolution to consider here is how Russia has 
come to define its national interests or national idea. Russians are looking at their 
national interests in two ways. The first is the "holistic" approach - that is, that each 
country has its own national destiny and mission to pursue. The second is the "positivist" 
approach that assumes that ultimately all states have the same interests in mind: survival, 
physical security, economic prosperity, ethnic identity, and so on. 153 Authoritarian 
regimes tend to gravitate towards the former approach, while mature democracies move 
towards the latter. 154 Russia has since 1991 hovered somewhere between these two 
political m~festations, at times becoming more like a mature democracy and at times 
reverting to authoritarian tendencies. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, the national idea 
of Russia was defined by the sacred nature of"Mother Russia."155 During the Soviet 
period this religious idea was replaced with the radical secular idea of promoting world 
153 Andrey Kortunov, "Russian National Interests: The State of Discussion," Russia's Place in Europe: A 
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socialist revolution. That idea was unable to survive even until the end ofthe Soviet 
Union. 
Now the question is whether the new idea will be that of the pre-Soviet period or 
that of a pragmatic liberal democracy. Since 1991 there has been an ebb and flow 
between these two ideas. The two competing philosophies are sometimes called those of 
the Atlanticists and the Eurasianists. During the 1990s, the influence of the Atlanticists 
has waned while that of the Eurasianists has increased. The first post-Soviet Russian 
Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, was of the Atlanticist persuasion, and sought to orient 
Russian foreign policy towards cooperation with the West.156 During this post-Cold War 
honeymoon period, hope was high for a successful Russian integration into a partnership 
with the West. Another important feature of Kozyrev' s foreign policy was the lack of an 
active policy towards the "Near Abroad."157 
This policy was of course not without opponents. Both communist and nationalist 
political forces were opposed to such a pro-West outlook. It is important to remember 
that, while Russia went through an extensive political liberalization in 1991-92, many old 
Soviet functionaries were still in positions of power.158 Many of these functionaries still 
sought to maintain Russia's status as a great power. While they accepted the dismantling 
of the Soviet Union, they believed that Russia's security depended on maintaining 
dominance in the "Near Abroad" and on keeping a balance with the West and NAT0. 159 
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Political tension grew between Y eltsin and the legislative branch throughout 1993 
and reached its apogee with Yeltsin's violent crackdown in October of that year. Though 
many political conflicts stemmed from domestic problems, opposition to Kozyrev's 
West-oriented foreign policy was also growing. Following the crackdown, even Kozyrev 
seemed to be moving closer to the nationalist side of the spectrum, declaring the need to 
"defend Russian national interests at all costs."160 
The emergence ofVladimir Zhirinovsky and his ultra-nationalist Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) also played a role in shifting Yeltsin's policies to the right. In 
December 1993, Zhirinovsky's LDP and other "red-brown" (neo-communistlfascist) 
parties were very successful in Duma elections. 161 Zhirinovsky espoused a particularly 
virulent form of Russian nationalism, calling for the "last drive to the south" to eliminate 
Russia's historical Islamic adversaries on its southern rim. 162 He portrayed Russia as a 
nation that had saved the West from Ottoman conquest, yet stood humiliated by an 
ungrateful Western civilization. In order to finally solve Russia's problems, and restore it 
to its former glories, "The Russian army will assemble for the last time for its southern 
campaign and will stop forever on the shores of the Indian Ocean."163 Although the LDP 
garnered only marginal support in the December 1999 Russian Duma elections, 164 
movements like the LDP served to push Yeltsin to the right. 
This move to the right was evident in the appointment ofYevgeny Primakov as 
Foreign Minister in 1995 and in his subsequent appointment as Prime Minister in 1998. 
Primakov was a longtime communist who had headed the KGB's successor agency, the 
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Foreign Intelligence Service. 165 This signaled a major shift away from any pro-W estern 
foreign policy, as Primakov was most familiar to Westerners for having been 
Gorbachev's personal envoy to Saddam Hussein during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. 
Hostility towards the West increased and has been more pronounced to this day. On 
issues such as NATO expansion and NATO's actions against the Serbs in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, Russia has been extremely critical of the West. Primakov' s foreign policy was 
also more oriented towards the Near Abroad, especially the Caucasus region. 
In 1999 Y eltsin appointed another former KGB officer, Vladimir Putin, as Prime 
Minister, and then made Putin his successor by naming him acting President on 
December 31, 1999. Putin has shown interest in pursuing a more businesslike 
relationship with the West, 166 but has staked his legitimacy on solving the Chechen 
problem.167 Putin's actions have signaled that "great power" thinking is firmly 
entrenched in Russian foreign policy. 
E. RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONS 
Several developments over the past decade have demonstrated that Russia views 
NATO as a potential adversary. Many of NATO's actions since 1991 have been met by a 
negative perception in Russia. These Alliance actions have led to a growing distrust of 
NATO among many Russians and to a general wors~ning of Russia-NATO relations. 
Many Russians fear that the United States and its NATO allies have an agenda for the 
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subjugation ofRussia. 168 The main areas of contention between NATO and Russia 
include NATO's continued existence and purposes, NATO's Partnership for Peace (PiP), 
NATO's enlargement process, interpretations of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo. 169 
NATO is generally viewed by Russian political elites as an organization aligned 
against Russia. This view applies both to the Alliance's traditional collective defense 
mission and to its recently acquired collective security tasks. It is probable that some 
Russians see benefits in the Alliance's continued existence- for example, the strong U.S. 
presence benefits Russia by ensuring stability in European security affairs. However, 
given the dynamics of Russian politics, this view is unlikely to be openly espoused.170 
The institutions for security cooperation that NATO has sought to advance, PfP 
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), have also aroused a negative reaction 
from Moscow. PfP has been seen by Russians as a form of NATO "imperialism."171 
Russia has also resented the fact that in both PfP and the EAPC it is accorded no more 
importance than other East European states. Russia's participation in the EAPC and PfP 
has been less than enthusiastic because the success of these organizations lends 
credibility to NATO as the leading security organization for the Euro-Atlantic region. In 
the Russian view, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Em:ope (OSCE) 
should be the primary vehicle for dealing with European security challenges. According 
to the Russian Minister of Defense, Marshall Igor Segeyev, 
168 For an example of the impetus for such Russian thinking, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Geostrategy for 
Eurasia," Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 5, September-October 1997. In this article Brzezinski suggested that 
Russia might be divided into three states. 
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.. 
fu our view, NATO must be transformed into a political organization 
which would comprise one of the components of European security in the 
21st century. This security architecture should be based on the OSCE, the 
only international organization on the continent that fully reflects the 
interests of all participating states in its activities and ensures that all have 
equal rights irrespective of their membership of various unions and 
alliances. 172 
These Russian attitudes are especially critical ofNATO attempts to promote cooperative 
security arrangements in the Caucasus, as PfP and the EAPC are the major vehicles that 
NATO has used to attempt to influence events in the region. 173 
NATO's enlargement to include former Warsaw Pact members Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic has also been a major area of disagreement between Russia and 
the Alliance. On this issue there seems to be a near consensus among Russian officials 
and commentators. Russia is opposed to the enlargement that has already taken place, 
and objects to any further enlargement, especially into the Baltic states. It appears that 
even the "pro-Westemizers" in Russia, in the words ofRussian scholar Tatiana 
Parkhalina, "do not dare speak out openly on their position with regard to NATO 
enlargement" because they fear losing political support.174 Other Russians see NATO's 
enlargement as evidence that the West has reneged on promises not to take advantage of 
Russian weakness. Many Russians maintain that there was a "gentlemen's agreement" 
between the Soviet leadership and the United States in 1990 to the effect that NATO 
would not expand beyond a united Germany. This claim is denied by former U.S. 
171 Ibid., 4. 
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Secretary of State James Baker.175 In the minds of many Russians, the enlargement of 
NATO is an attempt by the United States and its allies to extend their sphere of influence 
at Russia's expense.176 
Russia's interpretation of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act is also a source 
of tension between Russia and the Alliance. Russians tend to see the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a body that should give Russia the right of co-decision 
with NATO regarding security issues. In 1997 President Boris Y eltsin said that he 
expected that the PJC would serve as a body in which Russia would make "consensus" 
decisions with NAT0.177 This expectation was contrary to the explicit statements of 
Western officials that the PJC would serve solely as a vehicle for consultations with 
Russia. For example, U.S. Secretary ofDefense William Cohen stated in April1997 that 
"Russia will have a voice but not a veto."178 Though Moscow has had these expectations 
ofhaving a vote in NATO decision making, its actual behavior in PJC deliberations has 
often been uncooperative. 179 
NATO's intervention in the Kosovo conflict under Operation Allied Force in the 
spring of 1999 brought relations between the Alliance and Russia to their lowest post-
Cold War ebb. This intervention confirmed many Russians' worst fears about NATO's 
post-Cold War intentions and purposes. NATO showed its willingness to use military 
force in a non-Article 5 contingency without Russia's concurrence in a UN Security 
Council resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force. It demonstrated to Russians 
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the dilemma that they faced in dealing with NATO. In the words of Anatol Lieven, a 
British expert on Russian affairs, "The United States has made Russia a geopolitical offer 
that she cannot accept - and cannot refuse: that of a subordinate place in an American-
dominated Eurasian security system."180 Russia responded to NATO's intervention by 
suspending its participation in the PJC and in PfP and by suspending its military to 
military contacts with NATO countries. 181 Russia did participate in the eventual 
settlement and peacekeeping arrangements in Kosovo, but tried to make the resumption 
of its participation in the PJC contingent on the Alliance accepting Russia's interpretation 
of the Founding Act. This demand was dropped in February 2000 and a regular meeting 
of the PJC was held on 15 March 2000.182 
It remains to be seen ifPutin's government will continue to seek post-Kosovo 
improvements in Russia-NATO relations. Russia is still opposed to any further NATO 
enlargement and would almost certainly be opposed to any future NATO Kosovo-type 
operation conducted without its concurrence. Russia did ratify the START II arms-
reduction agreement and the Comprehensive Test Bah Treaty in April 2000, but it 
remains opposed to attempts by the United States to amend the 1972 ABM Treaty to 
facilitate the deployment of a limited U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) system. In 
general Russia is opposed to any measures that would grant legitimacy to what Russia 
sees as U.S. aspirations to gain "unipolar" hegemony. As long as Russia views NATO as 
a tool of American hegemony in Eurasia, real progress in Russia-NATO relations will be 
difficult. 
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F. RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE CAUCASUS 
Russia's interests in the Caucasus are long-standing. From the late sixteenth to the 
mid-nineteenth centuries, Russia sought to expand its imperial influence over the region. 
By the outbreak of World War I, some liberalization had taken place, and nationalist 
groups were beginning to stir. Following the collapse ofthe Russian empire in 1917-
1918, the three Caucasian nations declared independence. They were, however, 
subjugated by the Red Army and brought into the Soviet Union by 1921.183 The Soviet 
leadership effectively used divide-and-rule tactics against nationalist uprisings in the 
"autonomous" republics in the North Caucasus and in the three Caucasian republics.184 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Caucasian republics became independent. As the 
power of the Russian state has weakened, autonomous regions ofthe Russian Federation 
such as Chechnya, Dagestan, North Ossetia and Ingushetia have become areas of conflict. 
Russia's dealings with the North Caucasian areas of the Russian Federation and with the 
Caucasian "Near Abroad" states are two distinct, although interrelated, areas of concern. 
1. Caucasian "Near Abroad" 
As already discussed, the Russian process of dealing with the Caucasian successor 
states has included coercion and interference. Russia used separatist movements in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia to exert leverage on Georgia and bring it into the Russian 
sphere of influence. In Azerbaijan, Russia used the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict with 
Armenia to force the independent-minded Elchibey from power and supplant him with 
Aliyev. Russia's policy has been to officially maintain the legally correct position of 
182 Ibid., 11. 
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respecting sovereignty, while it pursues policies of subversion behind the scenes. Faced 
with the loss of its East European empire, it is attempting to establish a "Pax Russica" 
over the "Near Abroad."185 Outside observers have criticized these actions as 
demonstrating a return to traditional Russian imperialism. If Russia is truly to be 
accepted as a modem, responsible nation, it must follow the rules of proper international 
behavior. 
The response of Russians to these charges is that Russia's security depends on 
keeping close ties with the states on its borders, especially on the southern rim. Several 
rationales are often cited for this. One is the protection of ethnic Russians living abroad. 
Due to historical circumstances, all of the former Soviet states have some ethnic Russian 
inhabitants.186 However, in none of the Caucasus states is this as large a factor as in the 
Baltic states or in Kazakhstan.187 Some Russians also cite the "Islamic threat" as one that 
Russia must strive to contain on its borders. Although most people in this area are of the 
Muslim faith, there does not appear to be a real threat of Islamic fundamentalism 
anywhere in the region, despite the proximity to Iran. 188 Another rationale is the 
geopolitical one offered by Zhirinovsky - the supposed Turkish threat to the south. As 
discussed abov:e, however, Turkey has neither the will nor the resources to seriously 
challenge Russian hegemony in the region. 189 There are also the emerging economic 
issues, particularly with regard to the exploitation of Caspian Sea oil resources. These 
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rationales, however implausible and incoherent they may seem to W estemers, are 
generally accepted across the political spectrum in Russia as valid arguments.190 
Criticism from the West is decried as intended to humiliate Russia and keep it from its 
rightful place as a great power.191 
2. Russia and the North Caucasus 
Soon after the establishment of the new Russian Federation in 1991, unrest began 
to show itself in the North Caucasus. The cauldron of this unrest has been Chechnya.192 
There has been a long history of conflict between the Russians and the Chechens, as 
Russia has sought to secure the North Caucasus against Islamic incursions. Seeing an 
opportunity with chaos reigning in Moscow, Chechen leader Dzhokar Dudayev declared 
the republic's independence from the Russian Federation in November 1991.193 The 
central government proved unable to resolve the situation peacefully and embarked upon 
a military invasion in December 1994. The twenty months of war that culminated in a 
Russian defeat were disastrous for Russia as a military power. Moscow was unable to 
stabilize the region through force, and the defeat actually planted the seeds for further 
destabilization and conflict. This has been evident since the resumption of hostilities in 
Chechnya in September 1999. Russia's failure to subdue Chechnya despite the horrific 
destruction and suffering it has wrought undermines its claim to be a great power; and 
Moscow's methods raise questions about the wisdom of its statecraft. 
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Chechnya is not the only example of Russia's problems in dealing with its 
Caucasian territories. The neighboring autonomous republic ofDagestan was also a 
target for Russian military intervention in 1999. The other neighboring republics of 
Ingushetia and North Ossetia also present potential problems. All of these problems have 
been exacerbated by the complete ineptitude of the Russian government in making any 
political and economic progress in the region. The unrest in Chechnya and the rest of the 
North Caucasus represents a far more drastic strategic threat to Russia than any current 
foreign involvement in the Caucasian "Near Abroad." If Russia cannot control even 
territories nominally within its own borders, or make durable political settlements 
regarding these territories, the survival of the Russian Federation as a viable state is 
called into question. Moscow's inability to come to terms with these realities is a 
potentially dangerous source of future conflict brought on by Russian misperceptions and 
miscalculations. 
G. POSSIBLE NUCLEAR USE CONTINGENCIES IN THE CAUCASUS 
At least three possible contingencies for nuclear employment in a Caucasian 
conflict merit analytical attention. The first is the use of nuclear weapons on the territory 
of the Russian Federation in a conflict such as that in Chechnya. The second is the 
employment of nuclear arms in a war between Russia and one of the south Caucasian 
states. The third is a variation of the second with the added factor of Turkish 
involvement. A nuclear attack would not be brought about by accident or by a rogue 
general in any of these scenarios, but rather by the orders ofRussia's political leadership. 
In the first scenario, it is assumed that Russia might once again attempt to subdue 
a rebellious republic with conventional military force. This could occur in one of several 
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regions (Chechnya, Tatarstan, Ingushetia, Dagestan or North Ossetia). The war would 
follow a pattern similar to that of the First Chechen War of 1994-1996, with Russian 
forces becoming bogged down in a guerrilla environment. As casualties mounted 
without tangible movement toward victory, political and military leaders in Moscow 
would come under increasing pressure to bring the war to a conclusion. Political leaders 
desperate to save face would be unable to countenance a capitulation to the rebels, 
because this would undermine the regime and seriously call into question 'the viability of 
the Russian Federation as a political unit. The military would also be unwilling to accept 
defeat, because that would threaten its powerful position in the national security decision-
making process. The combination of these factors would lead to a serious contemplation 
of a nuclear strike in an attempt to bring about a reversal of fortunes on the battlefield. 
The Russians who have raised the idea of using nuclear weapons in Chechnya 
evidently fail to grasp how self-destructive this course would be.194 Russia has become 
sensitive about international criticism of the conduct of its wars in Chechnya. The 
international outrage over the use of nuclear weapons would, however, make the current 
criticisms with regard to Russia's handling of the war in Chechnya seem trivial. The fact 
that such a strike would be conducted on Russian territory would hardly be popular with 
Russian citizens. Nevertheless, in the fall of 1999, there were some calls by 
commentators in Russia to carry out nuclear attacks in Chechnya. 195 However, no 
evidence has been found of such suggestions emanating from official sources. 
194 For illustrations of Russian attitudes towards the possibilities of employing nuclear weapons in 
Chechnya see David Filipov, "Russia Pounds Chechnya Capital," The Boston Globe, 25 September 1999, 
A 1. Available through Lexis-Nexis, and .Andrei Piontkovsky, "Russia Goes Nuclear Over Chechnya," 
Jamestown Foundation Prism, Vol. 5, Issue 17, 24 September 1999. 
195lbid. 
78 
The second scenario would again involve a Russian incursion into the Caucasus 
that resulted in either military stalemate or defeat. This scenario is entirely plausible, 
according to Russian defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer: 
The Russian Army could easily suffer defeat in a local conflict in the 
Caucasus or Central Asia. The political and military consequences of such 
a defeat could prove wholly unacceptable to Russia, and a direct threat to 
use nuclear weapons or even a limited demonstration nuclear strike could 
for this reason suddenly become the last realistic possibility of winning or 
evening up a war that has been lost, although no one in Moscow is 
seriously planning such actions at this time, of course.196 
As discussed above in this chapter, Russia could become militarily embroiled in 
several conflicts in the South Caucasus. This scenario would represent an escalation 
from the first scenario because it would involve an attack by Russia against another 
sovereign state. It would also entail the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear 
state. One might assume that Russia's conventional forces, despite their weaknesses, 
would be able to prevail against Azerbaijan or Georgia. By this logic, Russia's forces 
should have had no trouble in sweeping through Chechnya in 1994-1996 and again in 
1999-2000. 
The third scenario would involve an even graver contingency. In this case, the 
circumstances of the second scenario would be repeated, with the addition of Turkey as a 
combatant. Any Russian attack against Turkey would be an attack against a NATO ally, 
and this would oblige the United States and the other Allies to honor the mutual-defense 
pledge in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This scenario has perhaps threatened to 
become a reality. In 1992, when Azerbaijan seemed to be losing its quasi-war with 
196 Felgenhauer, "The Russian Army and the East-West Military Balance: Self-deception and Mutual 
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Russian-backed Armenia, Turkey threatened to intervene on Azerbaijan's behalf. 
Russian Marshal Y evgeny Shaposhnikov, commander of the nuclear forces of the CIS, 
warned that, "If there is military interference by another party, that will obviously place 
us on the verge of a Third World War."197 These threats forced Turkey to back down. 
They demonstrated that Russia could make dramatic threats to prevent any outside 
military intervention in the "Near Abroad." 
The nuclear implications of such a scenario were discussed by Pavel Felgenhauer 
soon after the actual crisis had passed. In his scenario, Russia, hopelessly outclassed by 
Turkish land and air power, would be forced to turn to a nuclear demonstration to prevent 
defeat. Russia would make a demonstration nuclear strike against a U.S. radar station in 
Turkey to prove its resolve. Further strikes would be threatened, and the United States 
would be forced to negotiate a settlement favorable to Russia. Because of Felgenhauer's 
reputation as an authoritative expert, owing in part to his contacts within the Russian 
military, some Western observers suspect that his article was intended as a message to 
Turkey (and to NATO as a whole) regarding the possible consequences of any Turkish 
military involvement in the Caucasus. 198 
This scenario would be truly the most dangerous because a Russian attack against 
Turkey would almost certainly require a defensive response by NATO. It would mean 
that deterrence had failed from two perspectives. From Russia's standpoint, its military 
posture, including its nuclear arsenal, would have failed to deter Turkish involvement in 
197 
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the "Near Abroad" that Moscow considers its sphere of influence. From NATO's 
perspective, it would mean that its collective defense posture had failed to deter an attack 
against a member of the Alliance. 
H. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CONFLICT 
The Caucasus presents the greatest danger for major conflict in the former Soviet 
Union. Throughout its history this region has served as a battleground for competing 
imperial interests. It serves as an interface between Orthodox Christianity and Islam. 
Since 1991, the nations of the region have tried to assert their independence, only to be 
subjected to renewed Russian efforts to re-impose hegemony. Russia has tried to couch 
its interference in the region in terms of legitimate interests, but its actions have often 
been undertaken in an underhanded fashion. Russia does indeed have a great national 
security interest in stability on its southern borders. However, Russia, mainly because of 
its own dismal performance in reforming its political and economic institutions, has been 
unable to formulate a respectful and mutually beneficial strategy for dealing with the 
region. It has failed to respect the sovereignty of internationally recognized states and 
has used brutal means to put down insurrections within its own borders. 
The 1994-1996 war in Chechnya was a watershed for Russia because it 
demonstrated just how far Russian power had declined. By resorting to force to subdue 
the Chechens, Moscow instead demonstrated that the use of the Russian military was no 
longer a viable option. The army that was once dreaded by the West was defeated and 
humiliated by lightly armed rebels. Since September 1999, Russia has been proceeding 
down the same road in Chechnya. Although no major defeats have been suffered so far, 
the outcome is still in doubt. The statements by some Russian military leaders that they 
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would ignore orders to pursue anything other than a complete victory give cause for 
concem.
199 
The ideal situation in the Caucasus would be one in which the sovereignty of all 
states is respected and security problems are solved through international cooperative 
security organizations. Given its continued great power ambitions, Russia is an obstacle 
to establishing this state of affairs. Russian imperialism in the Caucasus may nonetheless 
provide a measure of regional stability if overseen by a strong and viable Russia. Neither 
Turkey nor Iran, the two other regional powers, has the wherewithal to compete in the 
region in the face of Russian hegemony. A strong Russian presence discourages them 
from competing against Moscow and against each other. However, further decline in 
Russia may encourage them to move in an effort to fill the power vacuum. 
The danger now is that Russia's capabilities to project power in the region 
increasingly do not match its desire to do so. Russia's conventional forces are in a 
decrepit state and are by all accounts growing worse. Judging by recent events in 
Chechnya and Dagestan, those in power in Moscow still consider the use of these forces a 
viable option, perhaps because Russian forces are numerically still much stronger than 
those of any state in the Caucasus. There are a number of conflicts in the Caucasus -
including Nagomo-Karabakh, Abkhazia in Georgia, and Ingushetia or qssetia in Russia-
that the Putin government may attempt to intervene in. This intervention could range 
from peacekeeping in permissive conditions to open combat. Given that Russia's 
conventional capabilities continue to erode, it is not difficult to conceive of a scenario in 
which Russia's leaders might feel backed into a corner and see nuclear weapons as the 
199 
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only way out. If Turkey or Iran had also become embroiled in the region, Ankara or 
Tehran might be involved in the nuclear employment contingency. Such scenarios may 
continue to be a threat until Russia acquires the conventional means to exercise effective 
hegemony over the region, or until it decides that it no longer desires to do so. 
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V. CONCLUSION: NATO OPTIONS FOR CONFLICT 
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines measures that NATO might take to prevent the occurrence of 
the scenarios described in the previous chapter and the Alliance's possible responses 
should one of these scenarios nonetheless arise. For conflict prevention, the NATO allies 
might exploit the potential of multilateral cooperative security organizations such as 
Partnership for Peace, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
United Nations, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. These measures might be 
supplemented by confidence-building and arms-control measures between NATO and 
Russia. NATO must also maintain its commitment to nuclear deterrence to lessen the 
probability of a Russian operational employment of nuclear weapons in a Caucasian war. 
If these prevention measures failed, NATO would be faced with unpleasant 
response options. It might consider responding militarily (and would be obliged to do so 
if Turkey was attacked), but would face the danger of further escalation. The Alliance 
would also have the diplomatic option of joining in expressions of outrage regarding 
Russia's behavior. Russia's operational employment of nuclear weapons would probably 
be a system-changing event that could lead to new calls for the abolition of nuclear 
weapons, and/or cause a return to a Cold War-type confrontation between Russia and the 
West. 
B. NATO OPTIONS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION 
The best way to keep any of the scenarios discussed in the previous chapter from 
coming to fruition is conflict prevention. If Russia does not become involved in active 
combat in the Caucasus, no reason to use nuclear weapons there will arise. The most 
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promising routes to conflict prevention include engagement and deterrence. An 
engagement strategy should use the existing frameworks for international security, 
including the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC). The engagement strategy should also include continued contact with 
Russia through the aforementioned organizations, as well as in the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and through national-level agreements between Russia 
and the United States. Arms control - perhaps including transparency measures- should 
continue to be a priority in relations with Russia, especially with regard to non-strategic 
nuclear weapons, since these are the weapons most likely to be employed in a Caucasian 
conflict. The Alliance must, however, keep in mind the difficulties in designing and 
verifying accords concerning these weapons. 200 These efforts must be integrated into a 
coherent strategy for promoting peace and stability in the Caucasus and for economic and 
political liberalization in Russia. 
NATO's diplomatic security instruments have already been used to some extent 
in the South Caucasus. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana visited the region in 1997 
and 1998. All three states - Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia- have become members 
ofPfP and the EAPC. NATO and the three countries have cooperated on issues such as 
scientific research and civil emergency planning. In October 1998 Georgia hosted an 
EAPC regional security seminar. This seminar was a forum for discussion of a wide 
range of security issues, including defense resource management, multilateral 
200 Yost, The U.S. and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe, 1999, pp. 49-55. 
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cooperation, and environmental cleanup. The goal of such measures in the Caucasus is to 
promote a degree of political stability so that economic reforms can bear fruit.201 
There are practical limits to such diplomatic security measures, however. For 
example, Russia has been less than fully cooperative in its dealings with the NATO-
sponsored EAPC and PfP. It is also relatively easy to discuss minor or non-controversial 
issues like those dealt with at the EAPC seminar. It is another matter entirely to 
effectively deal with security challenges that have the potential to lead to actual warfare, 
especially warfare involving Russia. A core theme in NATO's collective security 
rhetoric is that "security is indivisible." This reflects the Kantian-Wilsonian approach to 
collective security in which the international norms against war and aggression are so 
great that all the nations of the international community will seek to punish any nation 
that deviates from these norms. 202 This was the principle behind the failed League of 
Nations after World War I. The failure of the League illustrated that idealistic principles 
alone could not be depended upon to enforce peace. The United States' refusal to 
participate and the demoralization of France and Britain following the war were among 
the key factors that hindered any real enforcement. 
At the conclusion of World War II, the United Nations was formed with the 
principle that collective security could only function on the basis of a consensus of major 
powers. 203 This principle was the basis for the five permanent members with veto powers 
on the UN Security Council. In practice collective security measures are undertaken with 
either explicit or implicit agreement among the major powers, as in the case ofNATO's 
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intervention in the Bosnia conflict, or without such agreement, as in the case ofNATO's 
intervention in the Kosovo conflict ..:.. an intervention that Russia did not endorse. 204 
It is this reality that may undermine NATO's efforts to promote international 
security in the Caucasus. IfRussia is bent on being the sole arbiter of power in the 
region, achieving any major power consensus with Russia on regional security questions 
will be difficult. Any collective security measures in the region that do not have Russia's 
support may be doomed to failure. This is not to say that such measures are completely 
without merit. As discussed above, NATO's cooperative security initiatives have already 
produced some positive signs in the region. However, the complete success of these 
initiatives will always be contingent on Russia's participation and agreement. 
Organs such as the NATO-Russia PJC can also serve as confidence-builders to 
reduce the mistrust between Russia and NATO. NATO enlargement has been one of the 
major sources of Russian mistrust towards the Alliance during the past several years. 
Russia must be convinced that, although the new members are joining a collective 
defense organization, the prime benefit of expansion "is to enlarge the "zone of peace" and 
promote general European security. It must be shown that NATO is not striving to gain 
power at the expense of a weakened Russia. Judging by the reaction of Russians across 
the political spectrum to NATO expansion, these efforts have thus far met with little 
success. 
A lessening of the danger can also be brought about through bilateral national-
level contacts. Perhaps the most important of these are the negotiations regarding nuclear 
issues. Great efforts have already been made to reduce the chances of a false nuclear 
204 Ibid., 18. 
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attack alarm in Russia leading to a retaliatory strike on the United States. Military-to-
military contacts may help to advance the process of Russian military reform with the 
ultimate result of reducing Russian dependence on nuclear weapons. Arms control 
measures should also be pursued with the negotiation of a START III agreement and the 
revision of the ABM Treaty to accommodate the proposed U.S. National Missile Defense 
system. 
Arms control must also at some point deal with Russian tactical nuclear weapons, 
as these are the most dangerous in terms of the prospect for their actual use, either 
sanctioned or unsanctioned. In December 1999 NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 
repeated its call that Russia reduce its tactical nuclear stockpile. 205 Another option may 
be a formal arms control measure. Such an initiative could take the form of an air-
delivered nuclear forces regime that would phase out nuclear gravity bombs delivered by 
tactical aircraft.2°6 Such a measure would undoubtedly be difficult to negotiate, given the 
importance that Russia has attached to its non-strategic nuclear forces; but the concept 
warrants exploration. Furthermore, arms control alone cannot guarantee against the 
occurrence of the nuclear use contingencies outlined in the previous chapter. As long as 
Russia has ambitions for hegemony in the Caucasus but lacks the conventional forces to 
effectively achieve it, the danger of Moscow's use of nuclear weapons exists. 
Therefore, it is imperative that NATO maintain its own commitment to nuclear 
deterrence. The Alliance's nuclear posture will be a factor in any Russian contemplation 
of nuclear first-use. The Alliance's posture should make clear to Russia the risks in any 
205 Ministerial meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group Final 
Communique, 2 December 1999, paragraph 9. Available at www.nato.int 
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decision by Moscow to employ its weapons, especially in a contingency involving 
Turkey. NATO's commitment to nuclear deterrence was upheld in the 1999 Strategic 
Concept: · 
The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is 
political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. 
They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the 
mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military 
aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational 
option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by 
the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those ofthe United 
States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, 
which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall 
deterrence and security of the Allies. 207 
However, in the autumn of 1998, Germany, under its new Social Democrat and 
Greens coalition, called for NATO to renounce nuclear first-use as an option. This 
proposal did not garner any support in the United States.· As Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen stated, 
It is an integral part of our strategic concept and we think it should remain 
exactly as it is. We think that the ambiguity involved in the issue of the 
use of nuclear weapons contributes to our own security, keeping any 
potential adversary who might use either chemical or biological weapons 
unsure of what our response would be.208 
The German proposal did not gain support in the Alliance, and Germany signed on to the 
later statements of the NPG and the 1999 Strategic Concept reaffirming first-use as an 
option.209 
It is widely agreed among officials and experts in NATO countries that a credible 
Alliance nuclear deterrence posture requires the continued basing of U.S. nuclear forces 
206 Stephen P. Lambert and David A. Miller, Russia's Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An 
Ofportunity for Arms Control, 1997, 15-28. 
20 NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept, paragraph 62. Available at www.nato.int. 
208 Cohen quoted in Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, "U.S. Rejects 'No First Use' Atomic Policy; NATO 
Needs Strategic Option, Germany Told," Washington Post, 24 November 1998. Available on Lexis-Nexis. 
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in Europe to demonstrate the transatlantic commitment to extended deterrence and risk-
sharing. However, several factors could undermine this posture, such as the 
"delegitimization" of the concept of deterrence due to a nuclear accident or actual 
operational use, political concerns with Russia, no-first-use pledges, and U.S. and 
European domestic political considerations.210 U.S. nuclear disengagement :from Europe 
could have dire consequences for the Alliance: 
The withdrawal of a sense of U.S. protection could create incentives for 
some European states to seek nuclear weapons, or to form coalitions to 
compensate for the apparent disengagement of U.S. nuclear commitments. 
·The sense that America was withdrawing :from leadership responsibilities 
could stimulate competition for primacy among the larger European 
states.211 
Such a disengagement by the United States could also lead Russians to question the 
Alliance's resolve and could in some circumstances cause them to calculate that they 
would not risk a NATO response by employing nuclear weapons in a Caucasian 
contingency. 
In its relations with Russia, NATO faces the challenge of reconciling enlargement 
and the Alliance's commitment to nuclear deterrence with its confidence-building and 
collective security measures. Some Russians have been quick to exploit apparent 
contradictions in NATO policy. Russian Communist party leader Gennady Zyuganov 
said in 1998 that NATO's nuclear deterrence strategy should be "replaced by a 
philosophy of survival ofhumanity."212 Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo conflict in 
the spring of 1999 greatly added to Moscow's distrust towards the West. Effectively 
209 Yost, The US and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe, 1999, 67. 
210 Ibid., 71-72. 
211 Ibid., 75. 
212 Zyuganov quoted in Andrei Urban, "Zyuganov Urges NATO to Drop Nuclear First Strike Doctrine," 
Moscow /TAR-TASS, 28 November 1998. FBIS Translated text. 
91 
proceeding along its twin paths of collective defense and collective security will likely be 
the greatest challenge that the Alliance will face in its relations with Russia in the coming 
years. 
The success of any conflict prevention efforts will in the end depend largely on 
circumstances in Russia that are beyond the control ofNATO. Ultimately, Russia must 
make the hard choices about how it interacts with other powers. Russian leaders must 
come to realize that the best hope for Russia to prosper is to concentrate on improving its 
domestic situation and to pursue a non-aggressive foreign policy, especially in the former 
Soviet space. Russia's leaders must come to realize that the risks of military adventurism 
and nuclear blackmail are too great to assume. The Alliance may hope to exert some 
positive influence as these decisions are reached. Collective security measures and 
engagement can help Russia see the benefits of good relations, while diplomatic warnings 
and a strong nuclear deterrent can help it see the risks of aggression and confrontation. 
The challenge for the United States and the other NATO allies is to ensure that the two 
strategies are not at cross purposes. 
C. NATO RESPONSE OPTIONS GIVEN RUSSIAN NUCLEAR USE 
This section of the thesis examines the options that NATO would have in 
responding to each of the three scenarios and the larger consequences that might result 
from these scenarios. In the first scenario, a Russian nuclear use internal to the Russian 
Federation, NATO's response options would be rather limited. The Alliance would be 
unlikely to use force in response to a civil war in Russia. It is not clear what a NATO 
military intervention would be intended to achieve, even if the Allies could agree to 
conduct such an intervention, which is doubtful. Moreover, a NATO military 
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intervention in a civil war in Russia would be dangerous, given Russia's ability to 
threaten Europe and North America with its strategic nuclear arsenal. 
The primary response by foreign nations to this eventuality would probably be 
outrage. If the Russians pursued such a course of action, the resultant anti-Russian 
diplomatic firestorm would probably be more intense than any international protest yet 
staged in the postwar world. Russia might become an international pariah, denounced in 
the United Nations and in the court of world opinion. NATO could sever all formal ties 
with Russia and resolve to further strengthen its own conventional and nuclear forces. 
The Allies that provide aid and assistance to Russia could cease to do so. It is not clear, 
however, that all Allies would deem this the most enlightened and far-sighted course of 
action, given the West's continuing incentives to cooperate with Russia in certain policy 
areas. 
NATO's options in the second scenario are more difficult to formulate. It is safe 
to say that Russia would also in this case probably be the target of every known tool of 
diplomacy. In this scenario, however, Russia would have used nuclear weapons against a 
non-nuclear foreign state. There would be an instinct in the Alliance to keep the situation 
from escalating any further, while at the same time punishing Russia diplomatically. It is 
conceivable that Azerbaijan or Georgia would call for foreign military support, and that 
some of the Allies might favor intervening. Military intervention would, however, put 
the Alliance on very dangerous ground politically and militarily. Such a contingency 
would not warrant action under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, so a political 
consensus in support of intervention among the major powers of the Alliance would 
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likely be. hard to reach. (An intervention could, however, be justified- hypothetically at 
least- under Article 51 of the UN Charter.) 
Any NATO intervention would also carry with it the danger of further escalation. 
If Russia had already employed nuclear weapons once, it might well be willing to do so 
again. Russia might declare that any interference by outside forces would make those 
forces - and their homelands -targets for further nuclear attacks. It would be difficult to 
find a military response that did not carry the danger of further escalation. 
The third scenario would imply even graver risks. In this scenario, the Russians 
would have badly miscalculated NATO's resolve. If Turkey was the target of a Russian 
nuclear attack, the Alliance would be obligated to respond under Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. In order to maintain its credibility as an alliance, NATO would have to 
make an effective and appropriate response, not necessarily involving (but not 
conclusively excluding) NATO use of nuclear weapons. NATO's response would have 
the goal of restoring deterrence and the security and integrity of Turkish territory by 
demonstrating that the Alliance would not let such an attack go unpunished. NATO's 
main concerns would include controlling escalation, because such a tit-for-tat exchange 
could quickly go out of control. Questions regarding NATO's TNF policies that were 
never resolved during the Cold War- such as linkage to U.S. strategic ~orces; effectively 
conducting two-sided TNF engagements; and interpretations of Russian TNF policy13 -
might not receive satisfactory answers ifNATO was faced with the prospect of using 
TNF in a conflict with Russia. A Russian nuclear attack against Turkey would be the 
most difficult test in the history ofNATO. 
213 Yost, "The History ofNATO Theater Nuclear Force Policy," 1992, 248. 
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If any of these three scenarios were to occur, it would have a dramatic impact on 
world politics. The nuclear taboo would have been broken. It is quite conceivable that 
such an event (assuming that it did not escalate to a general war) could entail one of two 
completely different sets of consequences. On one hand, actual use of nuclear weapons 
could give rise to an overwhelming call to abolish nuclear arsenals once and for all. 
Those favoring abolition would see their position vindicated, as the existence of nuclear 
arsenals would not have prevented their use. Those claiming that nuclear weapons 
provide for stability and deterrence would have seen their position undermined. The 
revulsion of public opinion around the world to the events, including in Russia, might 
force the governments of the nuclear powers to seriously pursue nuclear disarmament. 
On the other hand, such events could also conceivably cause a reaction 
completely at the other end ofthe spectrum. Public opinion in the West might react in 
horror to Russia's actions and demand that NATO take steps to ensure that such a 
scenario never arises again. The Alliance would seek to redefine its nuclear posture and 
strengthen its deterrent. There would be calls for increases in military spending and a 
modernization of U.S. nuclear forces, both strategic and tactical. American public 
opinion would demand the immediate deployment of an expanded NMD system that 
could completely shield the United States from any missile attack. The Europeans would 
probably also lose their aversion to missile defense. Since a Russian nuclear strike 
against an Ally would show that existing deterrence mechanisms had failed, the Alliance 
would seek to deter any further nuclear use by adopting an enhanced nuclear doctrine. 
Under this scenario, arms control negotiations would cease and Russia would become an 
international pariah. At this point, Russia could either become more aggressive or 
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undergo a regime change with the goal of reclaiming its status as a responsible and 
trustworthy power. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The threat of Russia using nuclear weapons in a regional contingency is a real, 
albeit unlikely, possibility. This analysis has focused on the Caucasus as the setting for 
such a scenario because it appears to be the region with the greatest potential for conflict. 
However, the options examined in this chapter for NATO to prevent or respond to such a 
contingency could be applied anywhere in the "Near Abroad." As long as Russia 
maintains hegemonic ambitions in these regions with a military dependent on nuclear 
weapons, the possibility that one of these fictional scenarios may become reality remains. 
The best option for NATO is to prevent conflict altogether by promoting cooperative 
security and engagement with Russia. However, the success of such efforts cannot be 
guaranteed. 
Russia's ambitions and its conventional military weakness ensure that the threat 
of miscalculation regarding the operational and strategic utility of nuclear weapons is by 
no means trivial. There are sound political reasons for the Alliance not to publicly 
address such Russian threats. Doing so would lend them credibility and suggest to 
Moscow that they might be a useful tactic to employ. Confronting the Russians on the 
issue could also make Russia perceived as more of a threat in the eyes of Western public 
opinion. This could exacerbate the situation by reinforcing Russian fears of an 
American-led NATO that (according to the anxieties expressed by some Russians) has 
designs to subjugate Russia. 
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The problem is this: At what point might leaders in Moscow calculate that they 
could accomplish their objectives through the first use ofnuclearweapons? The threat 
may not become apparent until Russia is involved in a failed adventure in the Caucasus 
or elsewhere. At this point, however, Russia's leaders might consider their situation 
desperate and see nuclear weapons as their only possible recourse. 
Given the dangers of such an eventuality, NATO must maintain its robust nuclear 
deterrent and make clear to Russia that it would have nothing to gain from resorting to 
nuclear weapons use in a regional contingency. The Alliance must make Russia's leaders 
aware of the extremely detrimental effect that such actions would have on its standing in 
the world, as well as of the grim political and possible military consequences. These 
risks must be analyzed and faced squarely if they are to be successfully managed- by 
prevention, if possible, and by remedial action, if necessary. 
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